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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

RECONCILING THE CONFLICTING RIGHTS OF VICTIMS AND
DEFENDANTS AT THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

MUGAMBI JOUET*

I. INTRODUCTION
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) entered into
force on July 1, 2002, heralding a new era in international justice for the
prosecution of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. 1 Whenever
gross human rights violators are apprehended and tried at the ICC, their alleged
victims literally may have their day in court. The ICC reached new grounds in
international criminal law by providing victims with legal standing to be
represented by counsel and formally participate throughout trial and other
court proceedings. This article will explore whether victim participation will
unduly conflict with defendants’ rights and undermine the ICC’s ability to
justly adjudicate atrocity crimes.
The analysis of this article will revolve around three key premises. First, it
is a fundamental principle of international law that every defendant, no matter
how wicked or unpopular, has the right to an utterly just trial. The United
Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
recognizes “the inherent dignity and . . . equal and inalienable rights of all
members of the human family” and posits that all criminal defendants have the
right to a “fair” and “impartial” trial where they are “presumed innocent until
proven guilty.” 2 The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR) espouses the same moral and legal principles. 3

* Staff Attorney, Office of the Appellate Defender, New York City. B.A., Rice University, 2001;
M.P.A., Public Policy, New York University, 2003; J.D., Cum Laude, Northwestern University,
2006. I am grateful to Ambassador David J. Scheffer, Professor and Director of the Center for
International Human Rights at the Northwestern University School of Law, for guiding my
writing during a seminar. I also thank Professor Stephen Sawyer for his editorial suggestions.
1. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.
183/9 [hereinafter ICC Statute].
2. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, at 52-53, 54,
U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., 1496th plen. mtg., Annex, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966).
3. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, 72, 73, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., 183d plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948).
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Second, victims should participate in criminal proceedings in some
capacity. Victims of crime—in particular victims of atrocities like genocide,
crimes against humanity, and war crimes—have several important needs,
including: 1) receiving financial compensation for their harms; 2) seeing that
culprits get retribution so long as the punishment is reasonable; 3) having a
forum to speak and be heard; and 4) obtaining closure and truth about the
political affairs behind their harms. Participation in ICC proceedings could
help satisfy these needs and alleviate the suffering of victims of atrocities in
post-conflict societies seeking a peaceful transition towards democracy.
Third, during a criminal proceeding, defendants’ due process rights must
trump alleged victims’ participatory rights. The rights of alleged victims (the
accusers) and defendants (the accused) will sometimes conflict since they are
inherently adverse parties. Unlike the longstanding right of defendants to a
just trial with due process, the right of alleged victims to participate in
proceedings is a new concept in international criminal law. Victims had no
such rights in prior international criminal courts created by the global
community, such as the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), 4
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 5 and
the Special Court for Sierra Leone that was created by agreement between the
United Nations and the Sierra Leone government. 6 Likewise, the ICCPR and
UDHR do not grant victims this right. Defendants’ rights must therefore trump
alleged victims’ rights. As will be shown, the ICC’s Statute and Rules actually
adopt this principle. 7 In light of these three premises, the challenge lies in
reconciling the conflicting rights of defendants and victims by granting victims
the most participation possible without violating defendants’ rights.
The structure of this essay will proceed as follows. After briefly surveying
the ICC’s victim standing rule and its origins in continental European law, I
outline the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber’s first decisions on victim participation in
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, 8 which will be the first case tried by the
Court. I subsequently posit that, due to deficiencies in the Court’s Statute and
Rules, there is a risk that victim participation could violate defendants’ due
process rights, such as by lowering the prosecution’s burden of proof, shifting
this burden to the defense, and undermining the presumption of innocence. I

4. See Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994).
5. See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, S.C. Res.
827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 19, 2003).
6. See Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, S.C. Res. 1315, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1315 (Aug. 14, 2004).
7. See ICC Statute, supra note 1, at art. 68 § 3.
8. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on Applications for
Participation in Proceedings a/0004/06 to a/0009/06, a/0016/06, a/0063/06, a/0071/06 to
a/0080/06 and a/0105/06 in the case of The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Oct. 20, 2006).
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then add that victim participation may also interfere with prosecutors’ strategic
decisions and judges’ ability to manage proceedings effectively. I thereafter
suggest that the rule be amended or interpreted narrowly so that victim
participation does not conflict with defendants’ rights. Given that the ICC has
not yet completed any case, attention is paid to the experience of the ICTY to
illustrate challenges that the ICC may encounter. Next, I examine three
predictable counter-arguments to my proposed reforms to the victim standing
rule—namely that 1) granting defendants “excessive” rights will unnecessarily
frustrate efforts to convict persons who are obviously guilty; 2) the suggested
problems with victim participation are unlikely to occur because it is
unfathomable that any defendant at the ICC will be deprived of a fair trial; and
3) victims are entitled to full participation in ICC proceedings. Following
rebuttal of these positions, this article concludes by arguing that the interests of
victims are often better served by truth and reconciliation commissions than by
criminal prosecutions, although prosecuting defendants remains necessary and
must consequently be conducted according to international norms and
standards on defendants’ rights, which justifies considering the proposed
approach to victim participation.
II. ICC VICTIM STANDING RULE’S ROOTS IN EUROPEAN LAW
The ICC grants important rights to both defendants and victims. Its Statute
and Rules provide numerous due process guarantees to ensure that every
defendant has a fair trial devoid of unfair prejudice. 9 The rights afforded to the
accused include public hearings conducted fairly and impartially, equal justice,
prompt notification of all charges, discretion to choose one’s counsel or have
one appointed by the court if unable to pay, confidential communications with
counsel, adequate time and facilities to prepare a defense, trial without undue
delay, the right not to be compelled to testify without silence being considered
as proof of guilt or innocence, the right to be free from coercion, the right to be
free from inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, and the right to be
presumed innocent until the prosecution has proven guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. 10 The rights of defendants at the ICC therefore generally conform with

9. It is important to stress the difference between mere prejudice and unfair prejudice. All
relevant incriminating evidence introduced against a defendant is necessarily prejudicial to his
interests. That does not make this evidence unfair. Likewise, a prosecutor’s prerogative to argue
that a defendant is guilty is necessarily prejudicial to the defendant’s interests, although there is
nothing unfair about such arguments in and of themselves. Conversely, it is unfairly prejudicial
to violate a defendant’s right to a fair trial marked by due process of law.
10. See, e.g., ICC Statute, supra note 1, at arts. 55, 66, 67; International Criminal Court,
Regulations of the Court, May 26, 2004, U.N. Doc. ICC-BD/01-01-04, at 83-86 [hereinafter ICC
Regulations].
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international laws and standards on the administration of justice, as provided
by the ICCPR, UDHR, and norms of practice.
Moreover, the ICC recognizes that victims have important rights and
needs. The substance of crimes under the ICC Statute heeds the forms of
victimization that have been prevalent in recent and ongoing conflicts. For
instance, attention has been paid to the conscription of children as soldiers, 11
which is a particularly grave problem in Africa. 12 The Statute also “marks [an]
advance in the gender sensitiveness of international law[, as] it includes a
comprehensive definition of gender-based war crimes and crimes against
humanity” that encompass rape and other sexual abuses. 13 Besides the
substantive crimes that the Court seeks to punish and deter, a special support
unit is responsible for obtaining legal advice for victims, notifying them of
their rights, informing them of the Court’s decisions, ensuring their security,
and providing them with medical and post-traumatic psychological assistance,
including specialized services for victims of sexual violence. 14 Whenever the
Prosecutor opens an investigation, purported victims “may make
representations to the Pre-Trial Chamber” about crimes to be investigated. 15
Further, the Court is empowered to “establish principles relating to reparations
to, or in respect of, victims, including restitution, compensation and
rehabilitation.” 16 The Court “may make an order directly against a convicted
person specifying appropriate reparations” for victims and their families. 17
Alternatively, reparations can be paid through a special Trust Fund subsidized
by ICC member states. 18

11. ICC Statute, supra note 1, at art. 8 § 2(b)(xxvi).
12. Amnesty International, Report: Human Rights Owes the Child ‘The Best it Has to Give,’
http://www.amnestyusa.org/document.php?lang=e&id=B0275B42F3B4C25380256900006933EF
(last visited Sept. 2, 2007).
13. MARLIES GLASIUS, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY
ACHIEVEMENT 112 (2006); ICC Statute, supra note 1, at arts. 7 § 1(g), 8 § 2(b)(xxii), 8 § 2(e)(vi).
14. Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Sept. 10, 2002, U.N. Doc. ICC-ASP/1/3, at 16-19, 8691 [hereinafter ICC Rules]; ICC Regulations, supra note 10, at 79-82.
15. ICC Statute, supra note 1, at art. 15 § 3.
16. Id. at art. 75 § 1.
17. Id. at art. 75 § 2.
18. Id. at arts. 75, 79; see also ICC Rules, supra note 14, at 173-175; ICC Regulations, supra
note 10, at 88, 117. During negotiations to establish the Rome Treaty, a significant number of
delegations opposed a proposal that would have allowed the ICC to force a state to pay
reparations to victims if the state bore some degree of responsibility for the crimes. Opposition to
this proposal was partly rooted in the understanding that the ICC was intended to deal solely with
individual criminal responsibility. Christopher Muttukumaru, Reparations to Victims, in THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE: ISSUES,
NEGOTIATIONS, RESULTS 262, 267-68 (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999).
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Most importantly, the ICC Statute gives victims standing to participate in a
trial and other court proceedings. The rule is codified in Article 68 § 3 of the
Statute:
Where the personal interests of the victims are affected, the Court shall permit
their views and concerns to be presented and considered at stages of the
proceedings determined to be appropriate by the Court and in a manner which
is not prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a fair and
impartial trial. Such views and concerns may be presented by the legal
representatives of the victims where the Court considers it appropriate, in
accordance with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. 19

Article 68 § 3 was created after intense discussions between treaty
negotiators, as countries essentially split into two camps respectively,
representing civil and common law traditions. 20 Delegations from civil law
countries were particularly supportive of victim standing, 21 which is
commonplace in their legal systems, unlike in common law jurisdictions. 22
The French government and certain Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)
were especially insistent about granting victims broad standing rights. 23 The
ensuing compromise partly consisted of making victim participation
discretionary, as partisans of incorporating the term “may” in the Statute’s
language prevailed over those preferring “shall.” 24
Article 68 § 3 consequently became the principal basis for the ICC’s
victim standing rule, which draws its roots from continental European
systems. 25 Even though continental systems are not uniform and vary
according to whether they are civil Germanic (Austria, Germany, Turkey, etc.),
Nordic (Denmark, Norway, Sweden, etc.), civil Romanic (France, Italy, Spain,
etc.), or mixed (Greece), 26 they all give victims standing to participate in

19. ICC Statute, supra note 1, at art. 68 § 3 (emphasis added); see also ICC Regulations,
supra note 10, at 86-87.
20. WILLIAM BOURDON & EMMANUELLE DUVERGER, LA COUR PENALE INTERNATIONALE:
LE STATUT DE ROME (COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE) 203 (Olivier Duhamel ed., 2000).
21. Claude Jorda & Jérôme de Hemptinne, The Status and Role of the Victim, in THE ROME
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 1387, 1399 (Antonio
Cassese et al. eds., Oxford University Press 2002).
22. See infra Part II.A.
23. Jorda & Hemptinne, supra note 21, at 1400. Notably, in April 1999, the French
government hosted an international seminar on victims’ rights in international criminal law. Id. at
1399, n.43 (citing C. Trean, Organiser les Droits des Victimes Devant la Justice Internationale,
LE MONDE, Apr. 30, 1999). NGOs like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch also
advocated for victim participation. See id. at 1400, n.46.
24. BOURDON & DUVERGER, supra note 20, at 203.
25. See ICC Statute, supra note 1, at art. 68 § 3; Jorda & Hemptinne, supra note 21, at 1399.
26. MARION E. BRIENEN & ERNESTINE H. HOEGEN, VICTIMS OF CRIME IN 22 EUROPEAN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS 49 (2000).
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criminal proceedings under the concept of partie civile. 27 Conversely, victims
have virtually no such standing in common law jurisdictions like England,
Ireland, and the United States. 28 This article will therefore examine the
different role victims play in these systems as a background consideration to its
analysis of the ICC’s victim standing rule.
A.

Continental European Systems

Continental European systems use inquisitorial criminal procedures under
which victims have standing to participate in court and certain judges have
investigative responsibilities. 29 The primary systemic role for a crime victim is
as a civil claimant, which enables the integration of his civil claim for
compensation directly into criminal proceedings. 30 Insofar as a civil
claimant’s interventions are related to his claim for damages, he is generally
permitted to participate in all court proceedings by arguing his views and
concerns, questioning witnesses, appealing a defendant’s acquittal insofar as it
bars compensation, etc. 31 The procedure is advantageous for victims because
if the prosecution is successful, the victims will not have to prove the
defendant’s liability for damages in a separate civil suit. 32 When a defendant
is acquitted, jurisdictions vary on whether they allow victims to initiate a
separate civil suit for compensation. For instance, French law forbids civil
court judges from reaching decisions contrary to those of criminal court
judges, 33 but Norwegian law permits liability in civil court even if a defendant
was acquitted in criminal court. 34
In misdemeanor cases and, to a lesser extent, in felony cases, continental
systems generally allow victims to act as private prosecutors, which enables
them to directly summon the accused to court and seek to prove his guilt
without the involvement of government prosecutors. 35 Unlike a civil
claimant’s participation, a private prosecutor’s participation is not restricted to
the reach of his civil claim for compensation, thereby enabling the private
prosecutor to expressly seek the defendant’s conviction in addition to
damages. 36 Nevertheless, government prosecutors can usually intervene and
dismiss the case if they deem that prosecution is not justified. 37 Countries

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

BOURDON & DUVERGER, supra note 20, at 203.
BRIENEN & HOEGEN, supra note 26, at 39.
Id. at 39.
Id. at 27.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 319.
BRIENEN & HOEGEN, supra note 26, at 736.
Id. at 28.
Id.
Id. at 28-29.
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have instituted different checks on the private prosecutor procedure, such as
France’s provision that the private prosecutor must pay for court costs and the
accused’s legal fees if the accused is found not guilty. 38 Certain countries go
even further, such as Spain, which allows felonies to be privately prosecuted
by virtually any person, even if he is neither a victim nor a citizen, so long as
the government has declined to prosecute the case. 39
Accordingly, continental systems grant victims extensive rights to
participate in court proceedings, thereby effectively limiting the government
prosecutors’ discretion to control criminal cases. 40 In fact, if a government
prosecutor declines to investigate or prosecute a case, alleged victims typically
have a formal right to appeal this decision to a higher public authority who
may then order the prosecutor to proceed with the case. 41
B.

Common Law Systems

Common law systems typically do not give victims standing to participate
in criminal proceedings. 42 Their criminal justice procedures revolve around an
adversarial system pitting the state against one or more defendants. 43 Victims
are not formal parties to the process, and judges do not have investigative
responsibilities. 44 If a prosecutor declines to investigate or prosecute a case,
victims typically lack a formal procedural right to ask another official to
review the decision. 45 Certainly, victims can use the political process to
pressure a prosecutor to indict someone. Prosecutors who routinely fail to
investigate or prosecute cases are unlikely to either be reelected or keep their
appointed positions. Nevertheless, when prosecutors indict a defendant,
victims have no right to participate in proceedings until the sentencing hearing,
if the defendant is convicted. 46 Victims may nonetheless appear as witnesses if
requested by the state or the defense. But the common law systems’ reliance
38. Id. at 322; see generally Valérie Devrieux, The French System, in EUROPEAN CRIMINAL
PROCEDURES 218 (Mireille Delmas-Marty & J.R. Spencer eds., Cambridge University Press
2002).
39. BRIENEN & HOEGEN, supra note 26, at 28, 857-58.
40. Id. at 26.
41. See id. at 333-34 (discussing French system).
42. Observations on the American criminal justice system are based on the author’s
professional experience. Observations on European common law systems are based on BRIENEN
& HOEGEN, supra note 26, and EUROPEAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURES (Mireille Delmas-Marty &
J.R. Spencer eds., Cambridge University Press 2002).
43. BRIENEN AND HOEGEN, supra note 26, at 245.
44. Id. at 244, 248.
45. Id. at 270, 490. In America, the principle of prosecutorial discretion means that the
government essentially has unfettered discretion whether to prosecute cases. See, e.g., Reno v.
American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 489 (1999) (stressing that
“prosecutorial discretion” is a “special province of the Executive”).
46. BRIENEN & HOEGEN, supra note 26, at 39.
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on plea bargaining results in trial avoidance, which means that authorities tend
to dissociate themselves from victims when they have no need for them to
serve as witnesses. 47 As part of the adversarial system, victims who are called
to testify are subjected to cross-examination by the defense. 48 Conversely, the
inquisitorial system used in continental jurisdictions does not necessarily
authorize defendants to confront and cross-examine victims, which is
perceived as harsh treatment. 49
Nevertheless, it must be noted that criminal procedures vary across
common law countries. For example, victims in America have fewer standing
rights than in England. Neither the federal government nor any state in the
American system permits private prosecutions. While private persons can seek
punitive damages in civil court and recover substantial financial compensation,
only public officials can prosecute cases. However, in England, any citizen is
permitted to privately prosecute a case, even if he is not an alleged victim. 50
No special status is actually provided to victims. During a public prosecution,
victims have no standing right to join the case, unlike in continental European
systems. 51
Common law systems have counter-balanced the victims’ limited role in
criminal court by defending their interests in other ways. England has the
strongest state compensation scheme and victim support service of all
Europe. 52 Unlike judges in most continental systems, English judges also have
the authority to order defendants to pay compensation to the victims even if the
victims have not formally requested damages. 53 Further, common law systems
allow victims to assume a rather significant role at sentencing. 54 In recent
years, legal reforms have allowed the use of “victim impact statements”
explaining the harm that victims have suffered due to the defendants’ actions
and demanding punishment, financial damages, or other forms of
compensation. 55

47. Id. at 247.
48. Id. at 39.
49. Id. at 39.
50. J.R. Spencer, The English System, in EUROPEAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURES 142, 152-53
(Mireielle Delmas-Marty & J.R. Spencer eds., Cambridge University Press 2002).
51. Id. at 156. It must also be noted that acting as a private prosecutor is a difficult endeavor
in England, as indigent citizens or victims must find their own counsel, and the Director of Public
Prosecutions can dismiss the case altogether at any time. BRIENEN & HOEGEN, supra note 26, at
259, 270. Ireland also grants victims a limited capacity to act as private prosecutors. Id. at 47980.
52. BRIENEN & HOEGEN, supra note 26, at 285.
53. Id. at 244, 285.
54. Id. at 481.
55. Id. at 481, 267-68.
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Aside from compensation through criminal proceedings, common law
countries enable victims to seek compensation in civil courts as well. In
America, for example, victims can prevail in civil court even if the defendant
has been acquitted in criminal court, as civil liability requires a lower burden
of proof than criminal guilt.
A thorough comparative analysis of criminal procedures in civil and
common law systems is beyond the scope of this article. The foregoing
commentary merely demonstrates that the ICC victim standing rule is rather
similar to victim standing rules in continental European systems, somewhat
analogous to the right to private prosecution in England and Ireland, and
markedly different from American criminal procedures.
The ICTY’s and ICTR’s procedures are essentially patterned after the
Anglo-American common law adversarial system, 56 as the victims’ only role is
to serve as witnesses called by the prosecution, defense, or the court. Those
called to testify face possible contempt charges for failing to appear or to state
the truth, 57 although one can certainly imagine why certain traumatized victims
would prefer not to serve as witnesses, especially if they fear reprisals from the
accused. In sum, while ICTY and ICTR proceedings have little use for nontestifying victims, those victims serving as witnesses have virtually no choice
but to abide by the awesome power of the courts’ authority.
Victim participation in judicial proceedings may be a progressive
procedure because it recognizes that proceedings can benefit from the direct
contribution of individuals who have first-hand knowledge of the commission
of the charged crimes. 58 Permitting victim participation also suggests a
pragmatic acknowledgment that victims and prosecutors do not necessarily
have the same interests, as argued in Part V below. Victims can therefore
serve as a check on prosecutorial discretion, which is often unbridled in
common law countries. Besides, victim participation can contribute to putting
a human face on proceedings, 59 especially if the latter are conducted in The
Hague, a remote location from crime scenes often situated in war-torn
developing countries. In addition, the ICC may be able to administer
restorative justice by directly awarding reparations for victims, 60 which is

56. Jorda & Hemptinne, supra note 21, at 1391.
57. Id. at 1390; International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Rules of
Procedure and Evidence, Feb. 11, 1994, U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 39, at 77; International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, June 29, 1995, U.N. Doc. ITR/3/Rev.1,
at 77.
58. Carsten Stahn et al., Participation of Victims in Pre-Trial Proceedings of the ICC, 4 J.
INT'L CRIM. JUST. 219, 221 (2006).
59. Id.
60. Gerard J. Mekjian & Mathew C. Varughese, Hearing the Victim’s Voice: Analysis of
Victims’ Advocate Participation in the Trial Proceeding of the International Criminal Court, 17
PACE INT'L L. REV. 1, 17 (2005).
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permitted at neither the ICTR nor the ICTY, 61 although reparations are
increasingly required by international law. 62 Victim standing at the ICC might
therefore be a sign of progress, although adequate procedures will be necessary
to apply the rule without violating defendants’ rights.
III. THE ICC REACHES ITS FIRST DECISIONS ON VICTIM PARTICIPATION
In October 2005, the ICC issued its first arrest warrants, seeking the
apprehension of five leaders of the Lord’s Resistance Army, a Ugandan militia
allegedly responsible for killing tens of thousands of victims, as well as other
atrocities. 63 The five wanted men are accused of crimes against humanity and
war crimes. 64 But the case has stalled partly because of an ongoing
controversy over whether the Ugandan government should grant them amnesty
in exchange for a peace deal, and whether Uganda even has the power to refuse
to comply with an arrest warrant after referring the case to the ICC. 65
Meanwhile, another case will be the first to proceed to trial. 66 In March 2004,
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) referred a situation to the ICC
Prosecutor, which led to the opening of an investigation. 67 This eventually led
to the arraignment of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo at the ICC on March 20, 2006. 68
Lubanga Dyilo, known as a Congolese warlord and militia leader, is accused of
war crimes in enlisting and conscripting children under the age of fifteen and
using them to participate actively in hostilities, in violation of Article 8 § 2 of
the Rome Statute. 69 The allegations include kidnapping children as young as
seven and turning them into soldiers, sex slaves, and servants in the conflict-

61. Id. at 11-15.
62. Peter G. Fischer, Comment, The Victims’ Trust Fund of the International Criminal
Court—Formation of a Functional Reparations Scheme, 17 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 187, 197-201
(2003).
63. Emily Wax, Net Tightens Around Northern Uganda’s Brutal Rebel Militia: Lord’s
Resistance Army Unchecked for 20 Years, WASH. POST, Oct. 8, 2005, at A12.
64. Id.; Press Release, International Criminal Court, Warrant of Arrest Unsealed Against
Five LRA Commanders, U.N. Doc. ICC-20051014-110 (Oct. 14, 2005), available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/pressrelease_details&id=114&l=en.html (last visited April 11, 2007).
65. See generally Will Kony Come Out of the Bush?, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 21, 2006, at 56,
57; Heeding Truce, Rebel Leader From Uganda Waits in Sudan, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2006, at
A18.
66. Marlise Simons, Criminal Court Hears Its First Case; Congolese Warlord is Accused of
Abuses, INT’L HERALD TRIBUNE, March 21, 2006, at 3.
67. Jérôme de Hemptinne & Francesco Rindi, ICC Pre-Trial Chamber Allows Victims to
Participate in the Investigation Phase of Proceedings, 4 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 342, 342 (2006).
68. Simons, supra note 66.
69. Press Release, International Criminal Court, Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest against
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, U.N. Doc. ICC-OTP-20060302-126 (Mar. 17, 2006), available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/pressrelease_details&id=133.html (last visited April 11, 2007).
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prone Ituri region of the DRC. 70 The Pre-Trial Chamber ultimately confirmed
the charges against Lubanga Dyilo and allowed the case to proceed to the Trial
Chamber. 71
Lubanga Dyilo challenged the ICC’s jurisdiction to try him. 72 Several
victims were empowered by the Chamber to submit their observations on this
matter. 73 The victims argued that the ICC has jurisdiction and that Lubanga
Dyilo’s motion must be denied. 74 Victim participants likewise argued against
Lubanga Dyilo’s motion seeking provisional release from ICC detention. 75
Predictably, the Pre-Trial Chamber denied Lubanga Dyilo’s jurisdictional
challenge and release. 76 Even though these outcomes would probably still
have been the same if victims had not presented their views, their participation
as litigants on these important issues was nonetheless a clear victory for the
victims’ rights movement. Yet, the admission of victims into proceedings has
proved to be a tortuous path marred by controversial due process issues. 77
Thus far, the Court’s decisions have been more or less amenable to
victims’ applications for participation. In May 2005, well before Lubanga
Dyilo was charged with any crimes by the ICC, the Pre-Trial Chamber
received applications to participate in proceedings from alleged “victims of the
situation” in the DRC. 78 The Chamber subsequently appointed an attorney to
represent their interests. 79 In a noteworthy decision issued on January 17,
2006, the Chamber broadly interpreted victims’ participatory rights. 80 After
considering the submissions of the parties and the ICC’s Victims and
Witnesses Unit, the Chamber granted to six alleged victims the right to

70. Id.; Simons, supra note 66; Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-803,
Decision on the Confirmation of Charges (Jan. 29, 2007) at 86-101, 125-153.
71. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-803, Decision on the
Confirmation of Charges (Jan. 29, 2007).
72. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-512, Decision on the Defence
Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to article 19 (2) (a) of the Statute (Oct. 3,
2006).
73. Id. at 4.
74. Id. at 4.
75. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-530, Observations of Victims
a/0001/06, a/0002/06 and a/003/06 in Respect of the Application for Release Filed by the
Defence (Oct. 9, 2006).
76. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-512, Decision on the Defence
Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to article 19 (2) (a) of the Statute (Oct. 3,
2006) at 11.
77. Hemptinne & Rindi, supra note 67, at 347-48.
78. Id. at 343.
79. Id. at 343.
80. Id.; Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, ICC-01/04-101, Decision on the
Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of VPRS 1, VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4, VPRS 5
and VPRS 6 (Jan. 17, 2006).
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participate in court proceedings at a relatively early stage of the investigation
of the DRC situation, 81 which preceded the issuance of an arrest warrant
against Lubanga Dyilo on March 17, 2006. 82
Since Article 68 § 3 contemplates victim participation “at stages of the
proceedings determined to be appropriate by the Court,” the Chamber reasoned
that the term “proceedings” encompasses the investigation phase. 83 It
elaborated four requirements for determining whether alleged victims should
be allowed to participate in investigation proceedings. Relying on Rule 85 (a),
it concluded that applicants must: i) be natural persons; ii) have suffered harm;
iii) allege crimes covered by the ICC’s jurisdiction; and iv) show a causal link
between the alleged crimes and the harm. 84 The Chamber held that victims’
applications to partake in investigation proceedings would be granted when
there are “grounds to believe” that these four requirements are satisfied. 85
The Prosecutor strongly opposed the alleged victims’ applications, arguing
that victim participation “in the investigation phase was not envisaged” by the
Rome Statute, and that the purported victims’ influence “could jeopardize the
objectivity and integrity” of the Prosecutor’s investigation. 86 The Chamber
rejected these arguments and granted the six alleged victims’ applications to
participate in judicial proceedings related to the investigation. 87 The Chamber
also denied the Prosecutor’s request to file an interlocutory appeal of this
decision. 88 Notably, it held that: i) the Prosecutor failed to adduce “concrete
evidence” that victim participation in the investigation phase would impede the
fairness of the proceedings; 89 ii) the Chamber’s decision merely created a
“very limited” system of victim participation that essentially relies on a “caseby-case” evaluation; 90 and iii) “the Chamber will ensure the impartiality and
integrity of the investigation at all stages of future proceedings.” 91 The
Prosecutor then unavailingly sought extraordinary review from the Appeals

81. Hemptinne & Rindi, supra note 67, at 343.
82. Press Release, International Criminal Court, Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest Against
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, supra note 69.
83. Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, ICC-01/04-101, Decision on the
Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of VPRS 1, VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4, VPRS 5
and VPRS 6 (Jan. 17, 2006) at 8, 11.
84. Hemptinne & Rindi, supra note 67, at 345.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 343.
87. Id. at 343.
88. Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, ICC-01/04-135, Decision on the
Prosecution’s Application for Leave to Appeal the Chamber’s Decision of 17 January 2006 on the
Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of VPRS 1, VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4, VPRS 5
and VPRS 6 (Mar. 31, 2006).
89. Id. at 15-16.
90. Id. at 16.
91. Id. at 16-17.
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Chamber, which unanimously dismissed the appeal on procedural grounds
since no interlocutory appeal was permitted by the Rome Statute under these
circumstances, 92 thereby leaving the appeal’s substance “non-justiciable” at
this stage. 93
In spite of the Pre-Trial Chamber’s relatively broad interpretation of
victims’ participatory rights, it has not hesitated to limit victim involvement in
other respects. First, the Chamber placed restrictions on the scope of
participation of the aforementioned six alleged victims. 94 For example, the
Chamber twice rejected victims’ applications to participate in status
conferences, thereby depriving them of equal participatory rights to the
prosecution and defense. 95 Second, the Chamber clarified that admitting
victims into investigation proceedings for a situation did not grant them a
license to participate in a concrete case against any individual that may stem
from the investigation of the situation. 96 Hence, the six victims of the
Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo were constrained to reapply
for participation in the case of Lubanga Dyilo after charges were entered
against him. 97 The Chamber remarkably rejected their applications. 98 Three
of the alleged victims did not demonstrate “any causal link between the harm
they suffered and the crimes contained in the arrest warrant against Thomas
Lubanga Dyilo.” 99 The three other alleged victims did not provide sufficient
evidence to give reasonable grounds to believe that their harm was directly
linked to the crimes charged against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo or that they
suffered harm by intervening to help direct victims or to prevent them from
92. Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, ICC-01/04-168, Judgment on the
Prosecutor’s Application for Extraordinary Review of Pre-Trial Chamber I’s 31 March 2006
Decision Denying Leave to Appeal (July 13, 2006).
93. Id. at 16.
94. See Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-335, Décision Relative à la
Demande de Participation des Victimes a/0001/06 à a/0003/06 à la conférence de mise en état du
24 août 2006 (Aug. 17, 2006); Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-380,
Decision on the Application for Participation of Victims a/0001/06 to a/0003/06 in the Status
Conference of 5 September 2006 (Sept. 4, 2006).
95. See Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-335, Décision Relative à la
Demande de Participation des Victimes a/0001/06 à a/0003/06 à la conférence de mise en état du
24 août 2006 (Aug. 17, 2006); Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on the Application for
Participation of Victims a/0001/06 to a/0003/06 in the Status Conference of 5 September 2006
(Sept. 4, 2006).
96. Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-101, Decision on the
Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of VPRS 1, VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4, VPRS 5
and VPRS 6 (Jan. 17, 2006) at 17-18.
97. Id.
98. Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-01/06-172, Decision on
the Applications for Participation in the Proceedings Submitted by VPRS 1 to VPRS 6 in the
Case the Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (June 29, 2006).
99. Id. at 7.
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becoming victims. 100 Both the prosecution and defense had argued that the
alleged victims’ applications should be denied. 101
But this decision did not dissuade other potential victims from applying, as
the Chamber subsequently invited the prosecution and defense to submit their
observations on a whopping sixty-five new applications. 102 The Chamber
eventually concluded that fifty-eight of these applicants would be barred from
participating in the proceedings, mostly because they failed to substantiate a
causal link between their alleged harm and the crimes charged against Lubanga
Dyilo. 103
Further, as noted above, the Chamber invited potential victims to submit
their observations on Lubanga Dyilo’s challenge to the ICC’s jurisdiction to try
him. 104 The Chamber then granted three victims’ applications to participate in
proceedings. 105 All three victims were parents acting in a representative
capacity for their children, who allegedly endured harm and were killed as a
result of their conscription into armed forces led by Lubanga Dyilo. 106 The
parents also acted as victims on their own behalf because they allegedly
suffered as a result of the killing and harm wrought on their children and other
relatives. 107 The Prosecutor reasserted his prior position that victims’
allegations should be denied when they did not directly relate to Lubanga
Dyilo’s case. 108 Nonetheless, he supported victims’ applications insofar as
they concerned crimes sufficiently linked to the charges in the case. 109
The ICC’s decisions thus far may be perceived as a victory for victims’
rights. Yet, they concurrently raise problematic issues for defendants’ due

100. Id. at 7-8.
101. Id. at 3-4.
102. Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-01/06-463, Decision
Authorising the Filing of Observations on the Applications for Participation in the Proceedings
a/0004/06 to a/0009/06, a/0016/06 to a/0063/06 and a/0071/06 (Sept. 22, 2006); Situation in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-01/06-494, Decision Authorising the Filing
of Observations on Applications for Participation in the Proceedings a/0072/06 to a/0080/06 and
a/0105/06 (Sept. 29, 2006).
103. Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-01/06-601, Decision on
Applications for Participation in Proceedings a/0004/06 to a/0009/06, a/0016/06, a/0063/06,
a/0071/06 to a/0080/06 and a/0105/06 in the Case of The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo
(Oct. 20, 2006).
104. Id. at 4.
105. Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-01/06-228, Decision on
the Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of a/0001/06, a/0002/06 and a/0003/06 in the
case of the Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo and of the investigation in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (July 28, 2006).
106. Id. at 6.
107. Id. at 7-13.
108. Id. at 3.
109. Id. at 3-5.
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process rights. The decision authorizing alleged victims to participate during
the investigation phase might result in violations of defendants’ rights by
prejudicing the impartiality and independence of the Prosecutor. While any
investigation must devote equal attention to incriminating and exonerating
factors, alleged victims could unduly influence the Prosecutor to press
unwarranted charges. The Prosecutor could also be pressured to disregard
other factors that should be taken into account in deciding whether to press
charges, such as the crimes’ gravity, the burden on the Court’s caseload, and
whether prosecution will impede societal reconciliation. 110
The most controversial due process issue thus far may have been the
Chamber’s decision to allow certain victims to participate in the proceedings in
an anonymous capacity. 111 The Chamber faced a dilemma in deciding how to
balance defendants’ due process rights against the need to protect victims from
intimidation, threat, or harm. 112 It tackled this problem by barring the defense
from knowing the alleged victims’ identities, as provided by Rule 87. 113
Consequently, any information that could lead to victims’ identifications was
expurgated from documents and victims’ applications provided to the defense
for Lubanga Dyilo. 114
The defense vehemently protested that it must know who is bringing legal
proceedings and seeking compensation against the accused 115 by raising
several points: i) protective measures are extraordinary and were unjustified by
Rule 87 under these circumstances; ii) the victims’ applications amounted to
improper anonymous accusations; iii) the redacted victim allegations that were

110. Hemptinne & Rindi, supra note 67, at 347-48.
111. Witness anonymity has been another major issue. See generally Situation in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-01/06-437, First Decision on the Prosecution
Requests and Amended Requests for Redactions under Rule 81 (Sept. 15, 2006); Situation in the
Democratic Republic of Congo, ICC-01/04-01/06-447, Decision on a General Framework
Concerning Protective Measures for Prosecution and Defence Witnesses (Sept. 19, 2006);
Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-01/06-455, Second Decision on
the Prosecution Requests and Amended Requests for Redactions under Rule 81 (Sept. 20, 2006).
112. Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-01/06-437, First Decision
on the Prosecution Requests and Amended Requests for Redactions under Rule 81 (Sept. 15,
2006) at 8.
113. Id.
114. See, e.g., Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-01/06-463,
Decision Authorizing the Filing of Observations on the Applications for Participation in the
Proceedings a/0004/06 to a/0009/06, a/0016/06 to a/0063/06 and a/0071/06 (Sept. 22, 2006);
Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-01/06-494, Decision
Authorizing the Filing of Observations on Applications for Participation in the Proceedings
a/0072/06 to a/0080/06 and a/0105/06 (Sept. 29, 2006).
115. Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-01/06-379, Defence
Observations Relative to the Proceedings and Manner of Participation of Victims a/0001/06 to
a/0003/06 (Sept. 4, 2006) at 5-7.
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provided to the defense were too vague, such as by omitting or expurgating the
age of the children concerned at the time of the alleged incident, even though
Lubanga Dyilo is charged with using children as soldiers; 116 iv) a complete
defense cannot be organized without verifying a purported victim’s identity,
age, residence, and place of origin, as well as the location, place, and dates of
the alleged crimes; 117 v) expurgated information may be exculpatory or
otherwise useful to the defense, 118 such as by indicating the absence of a causal
link to the charged crimes; 119 vii) the accused’s right to be tried without undue
delay is compromised by constraining the defense to spend much more time
analyzing partially expurgated applications’ contents; 120 viii) providing
information about victims and their allegations to the prosecution but not the
defense violates “the right to equality of arms and to a fair trial;” and ix) Rule
87 § 3 does not prevent a victim’s identity from being revealed to the defense
but only to the “public,” “press,” and “information agencies,” as the rationale
behind the rule is that security measures must always be subordinate to a
defendant’s rights. 121
The Pre-Trial Chamber struck a middle ground in ruling on some of these
issues when the defense filed a motion opposing victims’ participation in the
hearing addressing whether the charges against Lubanga Dyilo should be
confirmed. 122 The Chamber found that the deterioration of the safety situation
in certain areas of the DRC had diminished the effectiveness of security
measures that could otherwise protect victims and witnesses living in these

116. Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-01/06-228, Decision on
the Application for Participation in the Proceedings of a/0001/06, a/0002/06 and a/0003/06 in the
Case of the Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo and of the Investigation in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (July 28, 2006) at 5. For example, the Chamber’s decision suggests that
the defense was even deprived of the following redacted basic information: “Applicant a/0001/06
is a woman of Congolese nationality from the [redacted] ethnic group, who currently lives in
[redacted] (DRC) and who is acting both on her own behalf and as the legal representative for her
minor son [redacted], born in [redacted] in [redacted].” Id. at 7-8.
117. Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-01/06-379, Defence
Observations Relative to the Proceedings and Manner of Participation of Victims a/0001/06 to
a/0003/06 (Sept. 4, 2006) at 5-7.
118. Id. at 7.
119. Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-01/06-228, Decision on
the Application for Participation in the Proceedings of a/0001/06, a/0002/06 and a/0003/06 in the
Case of the Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo and of the Investigation in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (July 28, 2006) at 9.
120. Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-01/06-379, Defence
Observations Relative to the Proceedings and Manner of Participation of Victims a/0001/06 to
a/0003/06 (Sept. 4, 2006) at 10.
121. Id. at 8-9.
122. Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-01/06-386, Defence
Submissions regarding the Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of Applicants
a/0004/06 to a/0052/06 (Sept. 4, 2006).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2007]

RIGHTS OF VICTIMS AND DEFENDANTS AT THE ICC

265

areas. 123 The Chamber therefore granted several victims’ requests to remain
anonymous in order to shield their identities from the defense during the
confirmation hearing. 124 However, the Chamber also held that the privilege of
anonymity comes with the cost of limiting the extent of victims’ participation
because “the fundamental principle prohibiting anonymous accusations would
be violated [if victims] were permitted to add any point of fact or any evidence
at all to the Prosecution’s case file against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo in the
notification of charges document and the list of evidence.” 125 Accordingly, the
Chamber held that victims would only receive notification of the public
documents in the case’s record and would only be permitted to attend hearings
open to the public. 126 Further, the Chamber exercised its discretion to
determine the extent of victim participation under Rule 97 (3) by allowing
victims’ representatives to make opening and closing statements but not
question witnesses. 127 The Chamber noted that it might authorize victims to
participate to a greater extent if they consented to the disclosure of their
identities to the defense. 128 Thus, the Chamber rejected part of the defense’s
arguments against witness anonymity and expurgation, although it reminded
the Prosecutor of his duty to disclose exculpatory or otherwise helpful
evidence to the defense. 129
The Chamber likewise denied the defense’s claim that victim participation
violates the presumption of innocence. 130 Notably, the defense had argued that
allowing purported victims to participate in the confirmation hearing assessing
the charges against Lubanga Dyilo would be premature since recognizing an
applicant as a victim entails recognizing the defendant’s guilt, thereby
violating the presumption of innocence. 131 The defense added that, by creating
a “grounds to believe” standard for recognizing someone as a purported victim,
the Chamber’s admission of victim applicants invited “an appearance of

123. Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-01/06-462, Decision on
the Arrangements for Participation of Victims a/0001/06, a/0002/06 and a/0003/06 at the
Confirmation Hearing (Sept. 22, 2006) at 6.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 7.
126. Id. at 7-8.
127. Id. at 8.
128. Id. at 8.
129. See, e.g., Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-01/06-517,
Decision Concerning the Prosecution Proposed Summary Evidence (Oct. 4, 2006).
130. Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-01/06-379, Defence
Observations Relative to the Proceedings and Manner of Participation of Victims a/0001/06 to
a/0003/06 (Sept. 4, 2006) at 14.
131. Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-01/06-228, Decision on
the Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of a/0001/06, a/0002/06 and a/0003/06 in the
case of the Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo and of the Investigation in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (July 28, 2006) at 5.
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prejudgment, if not actual prejudgment.” 132 The Chamber found that this
argument could not prevail “unless the procedural framework provided in the
Statute and the Rules is considered an infringement per se of the presumption
of innocence.” 133 But the Chamber concluded that victim participation posed
no such problem. 134 The Pre-Trial Chamber twice denied defense motions for
leave to appeal on this issue, holding that the defense did not demonstrate how
an interlocutory appellate resolution was required to ensure the fairness and
expeditiousness of the proceedings. 135
In sum, the ICC’s first decisions on victim participation have raised
concerns about defendants’ rights. Yet, this should not overshadow the fact
that the Pre-Trial Chamber has taken commendable steps to protect defendants.
It has encouraged the defense (and prosecution) to submit their observations or
objections on victims’ applications for participation. 136 Further, it appointed
an ad hoc counsel to represent the interests of any potential suspect during the
investigation phase of the situation in the DRC. 137 It likewise appointed an ad
hoc counsel to defend the rights of potential suspects during the investigation
of the Darfur situation. 138 It also reprimanded the Prosecutor for improperly
making ex parte filings aiming to prevent the defense not only from responding
to the filings’ content but also from becoming aware of the filings’ actual
existence. 139 In addition, it granted the defense’s motion to prevent the

132. Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-01/06-338, Decision on
Defence Motion for Leave to Appeal (Aug. 18, 2006) at 4.
133. Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-01/06-489, Decision on
Second Defence Motion for Leave to Appeal (Sept. 28, 2006) at 10.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 15; Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-01/06-338,
Decision on Defence Motion for Leave to Appeal (Aug. 18, 2006) at 10.
136. See Situation en République Démocratique du Congo, ICC-01/04-01/06-60, Décision
Autorisant Procureur et la Défense à Déposer des Observations au Sujet du Statut de Victime des
Demandeurs VPRS 1 à VPRS 6 dans le cadre de l'affaire le Procureur c. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo
(Mar. 28, 2006); Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-01/06-270,
Decision Authorizing the Prosecutor and the Defence to File Observations on the Applications of
Applicants a/0004/06 to a/0009/06, a/0016/06 to a/0046/06 and a/0047/06 to a/0052/06 in the
Case of the Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Aug. 4, 2006).
137. Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, ICC-01/04-73, Decision on Protective
Measures Requested by Applicants 01/04-1/dp to 01/04-6/dp (July 21, 2005) at 5.
138. Situation in Darfur, ICC-02/05-10, Decision Inviting Observations in Application of
Rule 103 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (July 24, 2006) at 6.
139. Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-01/06-166, Decision on
the Prosecution Motion for Reconsideration and, in the Alternative, Leave to Appeal (June 23,
2006) at 21. The Chamber also rejected the Prosecutor’s proposal that the defense show good
cause for revealing any expurgated material in the Prosecutor’s filings, as this would
impermissibly shift the burden of proof to the defense. Rather, the Prosecutor must convince the
Chamber of the need to expurgate any materials from the defense’s consideration in the first
place. Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, ICC-01/04-01/06-355, Decision on the
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Prosecutor from coaching, rehearsing, or otherwise preparing the testimony of
its witnesses, which is generally considered unlawful and unethical in most
countries, with the notable exception of the United States. 140 The Pre-Trial
Chamber also granted the defense’s request to have the prosecution disclose
any criminal record of its witnesses as relevant to assessing the witnesses’
credibility. 141
Overall, the ICC has thus far taken measures that have been either
favorable or unfavorable to victims and defendants’ respective interests.
Having reviewed the Court’s first decisions on victim participation at the pretrial stage, this article subsequently analyzes due process problems that might
occur at the trial phase.
IV. ANALYZING POTENTIAL DUE PROCESS PROBLEMS WITH THE VICTIM
STANDING RULE
Whereas the ICC’s victim standing rule has evident roots in continental
European law, it fails to specify whether victims will act as civil claimants or
private prosecutors or as a combination of these roles. In fact, the Court’s
Statute and Rules are rather vague and ambiguous on the issue of victim
participation, which could lead to differing interpretations of their language.
The means and substance of victim participation are often unspecified.
Under the principle expressio unius est exclusio alterius, one may infer from
omissions in the Statute and Rules that victims were deliberately precluded
from employing certain means for asserting their claims. After all, the Statute
and Rules do not formally empower victims with the right to participate in the
Prosecutor’s investigation, access evidence gathered by the parties, call
witnesses to testify, or file an appeal. 142 Victim participation in pre-trial
investigation proceedings may also have been intended to be restricted to
representations in writing. 143 On the other hand, one may posit that these
specific rights must logically be extrapolated from general statutory provisions
because the Statute and Rules should be interpreted broadly in order to give
victims concrete powers. 144 Indeed, without these rights, victims may lack the

Prosecution Practice to Provide to the Defence Redacted Versions of Evidence and Materials
without Authorization by the Chamber (Aug. 25, 2006) at 4.
140. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-679, Decision on the Practice of
Witness Familiarisation and Witness Proofing (Nov. 8, 2006).
141. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-649, Decision on the Defence
Request for an Order to Disclose Exculpatory Materials (Nov. 2, 2006) at 3-7.
142. Jorda & Hemptinne, supra note 21, at 1406, 1412-13.
143. Stahn et al., supra note 58, at 228. The Court Rules also state that victims are allowed
“participation in hearings unless, in the circumstances of the case, the Chamber concerned is of
the view that the [victims’] representative’s intervention should be confined to written
observations or submissions.” ICC Rules, supra note 14, at 91 § 2.
144. NICOLÁS CABEZUDO RODRÍGUEZ, LA CORTE PENAL INTERNACIONAL 109 (2002).
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ability to meaningfully participate. Their interventions could have little
weight, credibility, and persuasiveness against those of the prosecution and
defense. 145 Comparably, the Statute and Rules do not concretely specify
whether victim participation should be permitted in proceedings during the
investigation phase. The Prosecutor argued that participation in this phase
should not be permitted because victims were not specifically granted this right
under the Rome Statute, thereby effectively invoking the expressio unius est
exclusio alterius paradigm. 146 The Pre-Trial Chamber disagreed and held that
this right can be extrapolated from Article 68 § 1, which generally obliges the
Court to “take appropriate measures to protect the safety, physical well-being,
dignity and privacy of victims and witnesses.” 147 The Court’s judges and
Prosecutor have therefore already strongly differed in their interpretation of the
Statute and Rules.
Most importantly, the Statute and Rules do not concretely specify the
purpose of victim participation. This article previously identified four different
types of victim needs. 148 The drafters of the Statute and Rules may have
intended for victim participation in judicial proceedings to help alleviate these
needs, although the Statute and Rules themselves nowhere define either the
needs of victims or the specific purpose of participation. Article 68 solely
refers to the “personal interests” and the “views and concerns” of victims. 149
The Statute and Rules do not specify whether participation is restricted to the
reach of victims’ claims for financial compensation as civil claimants or
whether their role will be akin to that of private prosecutors who can expressly
seek the defendant’s conviction in addition to damages. Without knowing why
victims have standing, it becomes equally uncertain what victims will do in
court and when they will do so. If victims are to act as civil claimants, their
participation will be relatively narrow and consist only of introducing
evidence, questioning witnesses, or making arguments related to reparations.
Moreover, since reparations cannot be paid unless a defendant has been found
guilty, 150 victim participation could technically be delayed until sentencing
hearings at the end of trials. Conversely, if victims are to act as private
prosecutors, they will assume broad participatory rights and have the same
powers as ICC Prosecutors to seek conviction and retributive punishment for
the accused. They could then enter proceedings from the outset. This seemed
145. Jorda & Hemptinne, supra note 21, at 1412-13.
146. Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, ICC-01/04-84, Prosecution’s Reply on
the Applications for Participation 01/04-1/dp to 01/04-6/dp (Aug. 15, 2005) at 3.
147. Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-101, Decision on the
Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of VPRS 1, VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4, VPRS 5
and VPRS 6 (Jan. 17, 2006) at 12.
148. See supra Part I.
149. ICC Statute, supra note 1, at art. 68 § 3.
150. Id. at art. 75 § 2.
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to be the Pre-Trial Chamber’s interpretation when it allowed victim
participation early in the investigation stage. 151
Notwithstanding the Statute and Rules’ vagueness, we can infer from
Article 68’s language that victims should have broad participatory rights. It is
logical to assume that the “personal interests” and the “views and concerns” of
victims will relate not only to their need for financial compensation but also to
their need to see that culprits get reasonable retribution for their crimes.
Victims may therefore act as private prosecutors and be allowed to argue a
defendant’s guilt in and of itself, especially since obtaining damages is
contingent on a defendant being proved guilty. In addition to granting victims
expansive powers to argue, broad participation would also be consistent with
victims’ need for a forum to speak and be heard, as the victims’ lawyer could
then generally attest to their suffering and the defendant’s responsibility. 152
Broad participation would also help satisfy victims’ need for closure and truth
by exposing the state of affairs behind their victimization, an issue that will be
addressed in the latter part of this article. This author’s analysis of the victim
standing rule will therefore be colored by these assumptions and inferences
about why the rule exists, what actions it entails, and when victims will get
involved. 153 Naturally, these assumptions would not be necessary if the victim
standing rule was not so vague.
The only statutory provision impeding broad participation provides that
victims have the right to appear “at stages of the proceedings” that are “not
prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a fair and
impartial trial.” 154 In other words, defendants’ rights will trump victims’ rights
whenever they conflict, and victim participation must be deferred so long as it
conflicts with defendants’ rights. The main problem is that defendants’ rights

151. See Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-01/06-228, Decision
on the Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of a/0001/06, a/0002/06 and a/0003/06 in
the case of the Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo and of the investigation in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (July 28, 2006).
152. Even though a lawyer could speak on their behalf, many victims may wish to testify
personally. But the Statute and Rules do not specify whether victims have the right to appear as
witnesses themselves on their own motion, even if they are not called to testify by the Court,
prosecution, or defense. Besides, due process may require that victim litigants cannot serve as
witnesses because this would pose a conflict of interest. Situation in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo, ICC-01/04-01/06-379, Defence Observations Relative to the Proceedings and Manner
of Participation of Victims a/0001/06 to a/0003/06 (Sept. 4, 2006) at 22 (citing Jorda &
Hemptinne, supra note 21, at 1409).
153. As in continental European systems, victims at the ICC can appeal a prosecutor’s
decision not to investigate or prosecute a case. ICC Rules, supra note 14, at 107. A pre-trial
chamber can also review such decisions sua sponte and request victims’ views on the matter. Id.
at 93, 109.
154. ICC Statute, supra note 1, at art. 68 § 3.
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almost inherently conflict with victims’ rights due to the ICC’s definition of
who is a victim.
The Rules define victims as “natural persons who have suffered harm as a
result of the commission of any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court.” 155
It is fair to conclude that this definition encompasses victims’ family members
and close friends, who suffer indirect harm due to the commission of a crime
against their loved ones, especially if those loved ones were killed. Serious
injury or death to a provider can also affect the well-being of his
dependents. 156
When an alleged victim applies to participate in the proceedings, judges
are responsible for determining whether he is really a victim. 157 The Court
Rules merely state that a chamber “may reject the application if it considers
that the person is not a victim.” 158 Nowhere do the Court’s Statute and Rules
specify the standards for making this decision. The Statute and Rules do not
define what types of facts indicate that someone is a victim, although these
criteria can technically be determined by examining the statutory elements of a
crime. While the prosecution or defense can move to support or reject a
victim’s application, judges apparently have ample discretion to decide the
matter. 159 As noted above, in Lubanga Dyilo, the Pre-Trial Chamber exercised
this discretion to elaborate four requirements for determining whether alleged
victims should participate in investigation proceedings. 160
Discretion will also be required to remedy the Statute and Rules’ failure to
state the level of proof required to make these findings. How much evidence is
necessary to establish that a person is a victim? Is it the equivalent of evidence
sufficient to support a finding (a significant level), a preponderance of the
evidence (over 50% probability), clear and convincing evidence (circa 75%),
or evidence beyond reasonable doubt (near absolute certainty)? The Statute
and Rules do not answer these questions.
Certainly, Article 66 requires the prosecutor to prove the accused’s guilt
“beyond reasonable doubt.” 161 This could be a befitting standard for proving
that someone is a victim. Yet, because it is a high burden to make a
determination beyond reasonable doubt, it is unlikely that such a determination
could be made before the prosecution and defense have introduced all the

155. ICC Rules, supra note 14, at 85(a). The Rules also recognize that “[v]ictims may
include organizations or institutions that have sustained direct harm to any of their property which
is dedicated to religion, education, art or science or charitable purposes, and to their historic
monuments, hospitals and other places and objects for humanitarian purposes.” Id. at 85(b)
156. Stahn et al., supra note 58, at 232.
157. ICC Rules, supra note 14, at 89(2).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. See supra text accompanying notes 83-85; Hemptinne & Rindi, supra note 67, at 345.
161. ICC Statute, supra note 1, at art. 66 § 3.
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evidence, made all their arguments, and rested their cases. Applying this high
standard of proof would therefore defeat the purpose of the victim standing
rule, which seeks to have victims participate in the guilt phase of a trial and
perhaps even in pre-trial and investigation proceedings. 162 Judges will
consequently require a lower level of proof to establish that someone is a
victim. Predictably, in Lubanga Dyilo, the Pre-Trial Chamber set a relatively
low standard in allowing victim participation in investigation proceedings
when there are “grounds to believe” that the four aforementioned criteria are
satisfied. 163
However, allowing victim participation under such a low evidentiary
threshold could lead to violations of defendants’ rights. By finding that certain
individuals are victims, a judge effectively decides two key elements that the
Prosecutor normally would have to prove beyond reasonable doubt: 1) a crime
happened and 2) there are victims. 164 Indeed, the Statute and Rules do not
specify the procedural and substantive implications of allowing alleged victims
to enter the proceedings. One is thus left to conclude that by finding that
applicants are victims of the alleged crime for which the defendant is
prosecuted, judges also necessarily find that the alleged crime has occurred.
Judges will make these findings of fact on an incomplete evidentiary
record because they will rule on the alleged victims’ applications before the
prosecution and the defense have completed their cases. 165 This problem could
be technically resolved by having judges wait to rule on the applications until
both the prosecution and defense have rested. After all, alleged victims have
the right to appear in court “at stages of the proceedings” that are “not
prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a fair and
impartial trial.” 166 But this would again reduce participation to post-trial
sentencing hearings. Accordingly, the victim standing rule effectively entices
judges to rule on applications well before both the prosecution and defense rest
their cases, which may take months or even years. 167 The victim standing rule
might therefore lead to due process violations by encouraging findings on key
elements based on an incomplete evidentiary record and before the prosecution
and defense have made closing arguments analyzing the evidence.

162. Hemptinne & Rindi, supra note 67, at 343-44.
163. See Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, ICC-01/04-101, Decision on the
Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of VPRS 1, VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4, VPRS 5
and VPRS 6 (Jan. 17, 2006); Hemptinne & Rindi, supra note 67, at 345.
164. The ICC does not address so-called “victim-less crimes” like drug-dealing, which is
often described as a crime against society. For every ICC crime, there is necessarily a victim. So
finding that someone is a victim entails concluding that a crime occurred.
165. ICC Rules, supra note 14, at 89.
166. ICC Statute, supra note 1, at art. 68 § 3 (emphasis added).
167. Jorda & Hemptinne, supra note 21, at 1412.
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The victim standing rule might also violate other ICC provisions. Article
66 states that every defendant “shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty”
and that “[t]he onus is on the Prosecutor to prove the guilt of the accused . . .
beyond reasonable doubt.” 168 A high burden of proof therefore rests squarely
with the prosecution. But by enticing judges to find before a trial’s end—or
even its start, in Lubanga Dyilo—that there are victims and that, by extension,
the prosecuted crime occurred, the victim standing rule makes the Prosecutor’s
job easier. Indeed, the judge’s findings lower the Prosecutor’s burden of proof
on the aforesaid two key elements, thereby allowing the Prosecutor to
concentrate on his burden of proving whether the defendant is the actual
culprit. Naturally, a judge’s grant of an alleged victim’s application is not the
exact equivalent of a judge’s final verdict. Even after such a grant, the
Prosecutor will continue introducing evidence of victimization and of the
occurrence of a crime. Nevertheless, a granted application is the functional
equivalent of a preliminary verdict. In Lubanga Dyilo, the defense had this in
mind when it complained of “an appearance of prejudgment, if not actual
prejudgment.” 169 At the very least, it relaxes the Prosecutor’s burden of
proving that victims exist and that the prosecuted crime happened.
After the Court has approved an alleged victim’s application, a defendant
is still free to challenge this approval by introducing additional evidence and
presenting contrary arguments. 170 But this places the burden of proof on the
defense to rebut the aforementioned two key elements, although Article 66
stresses that the entire burden of proof rests squarely with the prosecution. 171
Article 67 § 1(i) underlines that the prosecution’s burden of proof should never
shift to the defense since every defendant has the right “[n]ot to have imposed
on him or her any reversal of the burden of proof or any onus of rebuttal.” 172
The presumption of innocence is therefore indirectly undermined by forcing a
defendant to rebut elements of a crime before the Prosecutor has proved them.
However, the presumption of innocence not only presumes that the defendant
is not the culprit, it also presumes that elements of a crime are not established
until they are actually proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Further, the victim standing rule unfairly prejudices the defense by
significantly limiting the range of defense theories available to an accused
person. First, the rule undermines the so-called “reasonable doubt defense,”
where the defendant argues that the prosecution is simply unable to prove all
the elements of the crime beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, the rule entices

168. ICC Statute, supra note 1, at art. 66.
169. Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-01/06-338, Decision on
Defence Motion for Leave to Appeal (Aug. 18, 2006) at 4.
170. ICC Statute, supra note 1, at art. 67.
171. See id. at art. 66 § 2.
172. Id. at art. 67 § 1(i).
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judges to find that there are victims and that, by extension, the prosecuted
crime occurred—all of this on less than proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Second, subsequent to the court’s acceptance that victims exist, the rule
makes it much harder for the defendant to adopt the standard defense theory
that “no crime occurred at all.” The rule effectively entices or relegates
defendants into adopting the separate defense theory that “there was a crime,
but I didn’t do it.” Arguing that no crime occurred at all is tantamount to
arguing that the law was never broken. The accusation could be a lie, or it
could be an innocent mistake, such as a misidentification. Comparably, the
defendant can argue that his actions were not illegal under the circumstances,
such as due to self-defense. Hence, “[n]o crime occurred at all” is a defense
theory that can be construed in various ways by advancing justifications and
excuses that are recognized as defenses under international law 173 and by the
ICC. 174
Admittedly, this theory is likely to appear completely far-fetched and
unreasonable in the overwhelming majority of ICC cases because the Court
only addresses offenses such as genocide, crimes against humanity, and war
crimes. 175
The magnitude of such crimes frequently results in the
accumulation of such damning evidence (mass graves, slews of video-recorded
footage, hundreds of eyewitnesses, etc.) that it is often impossible to
reasonably argue that no crime at all occurred. 176 Further, there is no question
that the alleged conduct was illegal, as one cannot reasonably argue that
committing massacres and other atrocities is permitted.
Consequently, one could argue that the victim standing rule is not
problematic because the “[n]o crime occurred at all” defense is wholly
inapplicable to the type of crimes tackled by the ICC. But this argument would
go too far, as certain ICC crimes are amenable to a reasonable use of this
defense theory. For example, consider the war crime of attacking civilians.
Among other elements, guilt requires the prosecution to prove that the
perpetrator directed an attack at a civilian population not taking part in

173. Antonio Cassese, Justifications and Excuses in International Criminal Law, in THE
ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 951, 951-54
(Antonio Cassese et al. eds., Oxford University Press 2002).
174. The ICC recognizes several justifications and excuses, including mental disease,
intoxication, self-defense, duress, mistake of fact, mistake of law, and superior orders. Id. at 954
(citing ICC Statute, supra note 1, at arts. 31-33). These are not absolute defenses that will
necessarily always result in an acquittal and absolve all criminal responsibility.
175. ICC Statute, supra note 1, at art. 5.
176. I write “reasonably argue,” as it is always possible to argue anything without being
reasonable. To this day, there are unreasonable individuals denying that Nazi Germany
committed genocide against the Jewish people during World War II despite massive evidence to
the contrary.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

274

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:249

hostilities. 177 A defendant may therefore contend that he is not guilty because
he was acting in self-defense since the civilians were actually involved in the
hostilities, such as by serving as rooftop snipers. Under such a theory, the
civilians would not be victims. But the victim standing rule would permit the
civilians to enter the proceedings, not even as alleged victims, but as actual
victims pursuant to a finding made on less than proof beyond reasonable
doubt. 178 The defendant would therefore be disadvantaged in trying to argue
that no crime ever happened because he first would have the burden of
rebutting the Court’s conclusion that these particular civilians were victims.
The sniper example described an incident involving the defendant and the
alleged victims, although no crime occurred because the alleged victims were
not victims under the circumstances. But one can go further and conceive of
other examples where no incident occurred at all and an accusation against the
defendant is entirely false. One need only look at the intensity of the hatred in
recent conflicts between, for instance, Serbs and Kosovars or Hutus and Tutsis
to imagine that elements of these populations would be willing to make a false
complaint in order to frame persons whom they view as brutal enemies. To
state a few examples, war crimes like unlawful confinement, 179 taking
hostages, 180 improperly using a truce flag, 181 or even running medical or
scientific experiments 182 are amenable to false complaints by purported victims
lying about what happened to them. “No crime occurred at all” would
obviously be an appropriate defense in such situations.
Hence, the victim standing rule could violate the ICC’s own guarantee to
afford each defendant a fair trial insofar as it might: i) infringe on due process
of law by enticing judges to make findings on key elements favorable to the
prosecution’s case based on insufficient evidence and arguments; ii) lower the
prosecution’s burden of proving each element of a crime beyond reasonable
doubt; iii) shift the burden of proof to the defense by effectively relegating it to
rebut elements before the prosecution has proved them beyond reasonable
doubt; iv) undermine the presumption of innocence by forcing the defendant to
disprove elements before the prosecution has proved them beyond reasonable
doubt; and v) curtail the ability of an accused to defend himself by making
reasonable use of the “reasonable doubt” and the “no crime occurred at all”
defense theories.
177. ICC Statute, supra note 1, at art. 8 § 2(b)(i).
178. For further discussion on alleged victims and the presumption of innocence, see John R.
W. D. Jones, Protection of Victims and Witnesses, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 1355, 1357 (Antonio Cassese et al. eds.,
Oxford University Press 2002).
179. ICC Statute, supra note 1, at art. 8 § 2(a)(vii).
180. Id. at art. 8 § 2(a)(viii), (c)(iii).
181. Id. at art. 8 § 2(b)(vii).
182. Id. at art. 8 § 2(b)(x).
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V. PROSECUTORS AND JUDGES MAY OPPOSE VICTIM PARTICIPATION
In addition to defendants, prosecutors and judges at the ICC may be tepid
about the prospect of victim participation. At the outset, it is important to
dispel any notion that the Prosecutor is necessarily the ally of victim litigants.
In both the DRC situation and the Lubanga Dyilo case, the Prosecutor has
vehemently opposed victim participation on several occasions. 183 While the
Prosecutor has supported certain victims’ applications, 184 it is now clear that a
peculiar de facto alliance between the prosecution and defense can materialize
against victim litigants.
There are numerous reasons why a prosecutor may be lukewarm about
sharing his duties with victims’ attorneys. While this would be especially true
of prosecutors from common law countries that do not permit victim standing,
it may be true of all ICC prosecutors in general. 185 First, a prosecutor and a
victims’ counsel may not have the same theory of the case, which would lead
them to make inconsistent arguments and undermine the prosecutor’s ability to
secure a conviction. Second, even if they have the same theory, they may
disagree over the proper trial strategy, including the wisdom of introducing
evidence of debatable probative value, the respective strengths and weaknesses
of a particular line of witness questioning, whether it is necessary to call a
potentially tricky witness altogether, etc. More specifically, consider the
example of a defendant who chooses to testify and is subject to cross

183. See Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, ICC-01/04-101, Decision on the
Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of VPRS 1, VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4, VPRS 5
and VPRS 6 (Jan. 17, 2006); Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, ICC-01/04-135,
Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for Leave to Appeal the Chamber’s Decision of 17
January 2006 on the Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of VPRS 1, VPRS 2, VPRS
3, VPRS 4, VPRS 5 and VPRS 6 (Mar. 31, 2006); Situation in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, ICC-01/04-01/06-172, Decision on the Applications for Participation in the Proceedings
Submitted by VPRS 1 to VPRS 6 in the Case the Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (June 29,
2006) at 3-4; Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-01/06-228, Decision
on the Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of a/0001/06, a/0002/06 and a/0003/06 in
the case of the Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo and of the investigation in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (July 28, 2006) at 3-5; see also Situation in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo, ICC-01/04-01/06-589, Formatted and Redacted Version of Prosecution's Observations
on the Applications for Participation of Applicants a/0072/06 to a/0080/06 and a/0105/06 (Oct.
19, 2006) at 12.
184. Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-01/06-228, Decision on
the Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of a/0001/06, a/0002/06 and a/0003/06 in the
case of the Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo and of the investigation in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (July 28, 2006) at 3-5.
185. For additional arguments regarding the Prosecutor and victims’ diverging interests, see
Jorda & Hemptinne, supra note 21, at 1394-1397.
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examination by the prosecutor and the victims’ lawyer. 186 The most dramatic
moment in a criminal trial often occurs when a prosecutor gets this unique
opportunity to directly question the defendant. While witnesses can typically
explain themselves in a re-direct examination by the opposing counsel, there is
great value to the sound cross-examination of a defendant who makes a series
of incriminating admissions pursuant to a prosecutor’s leading questions.
Since what the defendant says can sometimes literally make or break the
prosecutor’s case, the challenge of conducting a solid cross-examination is
particularly high in this circumstance. Naturally, the pressure on the
prosecutor will be vastly greater in an ICC case given the monumental stakes
of a high-profile prosecution for genocide, crimes against humanity, or war
crimes. Accordingly, one can easily imagine an ICC prosecutor sighing in
relief upon concluding the successful cross-examination of a defendant, only to
be disconcerted a few moments later by the fact that the victims’ counsel may
recklessly conduct another cross-examination that could allow the defendant to
redeem himself. In sum, since prosecutors may feel concerned that victim
participation will jeopardize their ability to convict defendants, it is
conceivable that they will object to victims questioning witnesses, introducing
evidence, or even participating in a trial altogether before sentencing.
The risk that victims and the prosecution will follow diverging strategies is
accentuated by victims’ apparent lack of a formal right to access evidence
gathered by the prosecution and defense. 187 Victims may consequently lack
the information necessary to fully understand the theories and strategies of the
other parties. 188 Accordingly, even when victims are determined not to hamper
the prosecution’s strategy, they may inadvertently do so insofar as they will be
constrained to operate under this procedural blindfold. 189 Moreover, this could
unduly prolong proceedings since victims may ask witnesses for information
that would otherwise be readily accessible from the prosecution’s files. 190
Wild goose chases could occur if victims pursue lines of questioning that they

186. We must generally note that cross-examinations are by nature delicate endeavors
because a lawyer is trying to extract probative information from a witness who has been called by
the adverse party, and is therefore frequently hostile to the cross-examiner. To many attorneys,
the motto for cross-examination is to “get in and get out” and avoid a “fishing expedition.” A
good cross-examination is often relatively brief and highly focused, as the cross-examiner must
keep control of the witness and delicately obtain the information from him without opening the
door for the witness to explain away his statements. A sloppy cross-examination will be
unfocused and allow the witness to justify himself or wander in his testimony by introducing new
information that was not elicited on direct examination and that may prove harmful to the crossexaminer’s case.
187. Jorda & Hemptinne, supra note 21, at 1412.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
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would know are futile if they had access to the prosecution’s evidence. Of
course, these problems may be the lesser of two evils, as forcing the
prosecution to share all its evidence with victims may not be advisable,
especially insofar as it concerns sensitive political or diplomatic questions.
Regardless, even if the prosecution were to share access to its evidence with
victims, voluntarily or by court order, fairness might require that it share this
evidence with the defense as well. 191
Judges may also have reservations about victim participation. Judges are
responsible for ensuring that proceedings run smoothly and according to
schedule. 192 Their responsibility is especially difficult in high-profile
international prosecutions involving complex legal and factual issues,
numerous witnesses, loads of evidence, and a palpable sense of emotion and
tension due to the gravity of the accusations, high political stakes, and intense
public scrutiny afforded by incessant media coverage. The introduction of
victims as represented parties into ICC proceedings will further complicate
these matters and render international criminal trials even harder to manage,
especially if separate lawyers represent different groups of victims. Thus,
judges may try to limit the extent of victim participation.
Victim participation could make ICC judges’ jobs more difficult than those
of judges at the ICTY and ICTR, where prosecutors are essentially solely
responsible for representing and safeguarding victims’ interests. 193
Conversely, ICC judges have a great responsibility to protect victim’s interests
since they must decide the extent of their participation. 194 Moreover, ICC
judges are exclusively responsible for dealing with all technical matters
relating to assessing victims’ reparations. 195 Judge Claude Jorda, who
formerly served as Presiding Judge on the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber, has
underlined that, by granting judges what may prove to be an intractable duty
due to the large scale of ICC crimes and ensuing reparation claims, the
Statute’s framers took the risk of “complicating the proceedings before the
Court and of seriously compromising the[ir] expeditious conduct.” 196 For

191. The defense for Lubanga Dyilo has argued that providing information about victims and
their allegations to the prosecution but not the defense violates “the right to equality of arms and
to a fair trial.” Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-01/06-379,
Defence Observations Relative to the Proceedings and Manner of Participation of Victims
a/0001/06 to a/0003/06 (Sept. 4, 2006) at 6. While the Pre-Trial Chamber rejected this argument,
it has emphasized that the prosecution must disclose exculpatory or favorable evidence to the
defense. See, e.g., Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-01/06-517,
Decision Concerning the Prosecution Proposed Summary Evidence (Oct. 4, 2006).
192. See Jorda & Hemptinne, supra note 21, at 1413.
193. Id. at 1408.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 1407.
196. Id. at 1414-15; see also ICC Rules, supra note 14, at 97.
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instance, in the first six months after Lubanga Dyilo began, the Pre-Trial
Chamber has already had to examine dozens of victim applications. 197 This
burden will probably grow exponentially as the ICC takes on more and more
cases.
Notwithstanding possible opposition from Prosecutors and judges, Article
68 § 3 only restricts victim participation insofar as it is “prejudicial to or
inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a fair and impartial trial.” 198
Nothing specifically provides for victim participation to be limited when it is
inconsistent with the objectives or the strategy of a Prosecutor. Judges may
therefore be unreceptive to the objections that prosecutors will have to victim
participation. Similarly, judges will have little choice but to permit victim
participation even when it hinders their ability to manage proceedings
effectively. 199
Despite the protections that Article 68 § 3 affords to the defense, the
accused likely will have to bear the brunt of the troubles associated with victim
participation. In addition to the aforementioned due process problems, victim
participation will extend proceedings that are already extremely complicated
and long, which could potentially violate the accused’s right under Article 67 §
1(c) to a fair trial devoid of undue delay. 200 The defense for Lubanga Dyilo
has already been confronted with the need to respond to forty-three new
requests for victim participation under a rather short deadline. The defense
protested that it lacked the time and resources to examine and investigate
victims’ applications given its workload in tackling a host of other matters
pending trial, which purportedly violated Article 67 § 1(b)’s guarantee of
adequate time and facilities for the preparation of the defense. 201 The Chamber
took steps towards addressing these concerns by granting deadline
extensions 202 and providing the defense with an additional legal assistant. 203

197. See, e.g., Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-01/06-463,
Decision Authorizing the Filing of Observations on the Applications for Participation in the
Proceedings a/0004/06 to a/0009/06, a/0016/06 to a/0063/06 and a/0071/06 (Sept. 22, 2006);
Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-01/06-494, Decision
Authorizing the Filing of Observations on Applications for Participation in the Proceedings
a/0072/06 to a/0080/06 and a/0105/06 (Sept. 29, 2006).
198. ICC Statute, supra note 1, at art. 68 § 3 (emphasis added).
199. Jorda & Hemptinne, supra note 21, at 1411.
200. Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-01/06-379, Defence
Observations Relative to the Proceedings and Manner of Participation of Victims a/0001/06 to
a/0003/06 (Sept. 4, 2006) at 15-16; Stahn et al., supra note 58, at 223.
201. Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-01/06-379, Defence
Observations Relative to the Proceedings and Manner of Participation of Victims a/0001/06 to
a/0003/06 (Sept. 4, 2006) at 15-16.
202. See, e.g., Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-01/06-407,
Decision on the Prosecution Deadline of 12 September 2006 and the Defence Deadline of 12
September 2006 (Sept. 7, 2006).
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Slowing down cases and increasing resources for the Court, Prosecutor,
and defense may be the only way of containing the increased workload
associated with victim participation. Of course, slowing cases even further is
unlikely to satisfy victim litigants, victims at large, and the general public, who
all generally complain about the slow pace of cases at the ICTR and ICTY.
But this may be a reasonable price to pay for victim participation. Most
importantly, in light of the due process risks associated with participation, the
victim standing rule may have to be amended or interpreted in a way that does
not infringe on defendants’ rights.
VI. SUGGESTED AMENDMENT OR INTERPRETATION OF THE VICTIM STANDING
RULE
The ICC Statute and Rules may have internal contradictions between
victims’ and defendants’ rights. The challenge lies in reconciling the
conflicting rights of defendants and victims by granting victims the most
participation possible without violating defendants’ rights. There are two
possible remedies to this problem: adequately interpreting the victim standing
rule or amending it.
An adequate interpretation of the Statute and Rules could focus on Article
68 § 3, which effectively posits that defendants’ rights trump victims’ rights. 204
Victims do not have absolute participatory rights since they can only get
involved in “stages of the proceedings determined to be appropriate by the
Court and in a manner which is not prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights
of the accused and a fair and impartial trial.” 205 Thus, the question is not
whether victims should enter the proceedings. It is when they should do so.
The victim standing rule might not violate defendants’ rights if the ICC
declines alleged victims the right to enter the proceedings until after they have
been proved to be actual victims beyond reasonable doubt. Bifurcating
proceedings could be a step towards resolving this problem, as it would
preclude judges from allowing victims to enter proceedings before the
prosecution or a victim litigant has established beyond reasonable doubt that: i)
a crime occurred; and ii) the alleged victims are the actual victims of this
crime. After this first step, the case would then move on to address the second
step of whether the defendant is the actual culprit, as well as any other
elements. 206 Nevertheless, bifurcating trials might not work in practice. When
the prosecution would move for a ruling on these two elements, the defense

203. Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-01/06-460, Decision on
Defence Request pursuant to Regulation 83 (4) (Sept. 22, 2006) at 3.
204. ICC Statute, supra note 1, at art. 68 § 3.
205. Id.
206. Note that Judge Jorda of the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber has offered an alternative proposal
for bifurcating proceedings. Jorda & Hemptinne, supra note 21, at 1414.
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may object that the ruling must be delayed until the defense has rested its
entire case and made its closing arguments. If a judge overruled the objection
and found that the two elements had been met, this could compel the defense to
rebut these elements and shift the burden of proof in violation of Article 67 § 1
(i). Notwithstanding these eventual complications, bifurcating proceedings has
the potential to remedy or attenuate the aforesaid due process problems.
Support for bifurcating proceedings under this interpretation of the Statute
lies in the fact that the ICC’s Statute and Rules, contrary to what some
commentators have argued, 207 do not provide for a utilitarian balancing test
measuring the benefits of a victim’s participation against its costs in unfairly
prejudicing a defendant’s trial. The Statute and Rules say nothing of balancing
a victim’s interests against a defendant’s rights. Instead, Article 68 § 3 states
that victims are not allowed to participate in legal proceedings if this would be
“prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused.” 208 Conversely, a
utilitarian balancing test would allow victims to participate when their interest
in doing so is deemed to outweigh prejudice to defendants’ rights. By
implication, a balancing test would permit victim participation even if it
violated defendants’ rights because the emphasis would not be on the
importance of the violation but on whether victims’ interest in participating
outweighed the violation. Yet, Article 68 § 3 emphasizes that victim
participation is impermissible if it would violate defendants’ rights, regardless
of whether the violation would be relatively minor in comparison to victims’
interests in participating. 209
Certainly, Article 69 § 4 suggests a balancing test by emphasizing that the
Court may consider “the probative value of the evidence and any prejudice that
such evidence may cause to a fair trial.” 210 But this balancing test does not
apply to victim participation issues since Article 69 (titled “Evidence”) is
supplanted by the more specific rule provided under Article 68 (titled
“Protection of the victims and witnesses and their participation in the
proceedings”). 211 Thus, the applicable rule as provided by Article 68 is that
victim participation is always impermissible if it would result in any unfair
prejudice, even if the victims’ interests might outweigh the unfair prejudice.
The ICC member states should consider amending the Statute to codify
this interpretation. Nonetheless, limiting victim participation to the second
phase of the bifurcated procedure may not be politically feasible because this
could be seen as going too far in retracting victims’ rights. But the member

207. Mekjian & Varughese, supra note 60, at 29-34.
208. ICC Statute, supra note 1, at art. 68 § 3; see also ICC Rules, supra note 14, at 91 § 3.
209. See ICC Statute, supra note 1, at art. 68 § 3.
210. Id. at art. 69. This balancing test is akin to Federal Rule of Evidence 403 in American
law. See FED. R. EVID. 403.
211. See ICC Statute, supra note 1, at arts. 68, 69.
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states should still consider amending the Statute and Rules to ensure that
defendants’ rights are duly protected if victims are to participate throughout
investigation, pre-trial, trial, and appellate proceedings. Adequate procedures
for victim participation are required because the current standards are far too
vague, which will give way to extensive judicial discretion. Of course, judicial
discretion can certainly be very positive because legislators cannot foresee and
codify all issues and situations. In fact, during Rome Statute negotiations,
many delegations were preoccupied that victim participation might become
unmanageable due to the large number of victims. 212 Instead of developing
specific procedures on victim standing, the drafters therefore apparently
proceeded to leave the modalities of victim participation to be resolved by
judges’ discretion. 213 Judges will consequently have the discretion to make
many important decisions, and the extent of victim participation will
presumably be resolved by the Court’s jurisprudence as cases are litigated.
While judicial discretion may prove beneficial in allowing flexible
decision-making, the Statute’s drafters may have overlooked the risk that the
victim standing rule could be construed in ways that are unfairly prejudicial to
defendants’ rights. Thus, an amendment may be necessary. An appropriate
construction of the victim standing rule could be a provision in the vein of:
A judge must reject the application of an alleged victim if there is not a
reasonable basis to conclude that this person could be proved to be an actual
victim at trial. Allowing an alleged victim to participate in proceedings is not a
recognition that the prosecuted crime occurred. The prosecutor or an alleged
victim has the burden of proving that the prosecuted crime occurred beyond
reasonable doubt. The prosecutor or an alleged victim has the burden of
proving that the alleged victim is an actual victim beyond reasonable doubt.
An alleged victim will be referred to as a private accuser in all court
proceedings until proven to be an actual victim beyond reasonable doubt in a
final judgment of conviction. 214

This proposed rule would draw a strict distinction between an alleged
victim and an actual victim and create a specific evidentiary standard of
reasonableness as the degree of proof for allowing someone to be recognized
as an alleged victim. Of course, reasonableness can be an imprecise
evidentiary standard because judges may have different conceptions of what is
reasonable.
Yet, judges could not realistically make meaningful
determinations under preponderance of the evidence, clear and convincing
evidence, or beyond reasonable doubt standard until a trial had been concluded

212. Gilbert Bitti & Håkan Friman, Participation of Victims in the Proceedings, in THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: ELEMENTS OF CRIMES AND RULES OF PROCEDURE AND
EVIDENCE 456, 457 (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999).
213. Id.
214. Emphasis added for demonstrative purposes.
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and all evidence and arguments are on the record. This could frustrate the
rule’s purpose by limiting victim participation until sentencing or reparation
proceedings. Reasonableness could be a relatively low level of proof, although
it is appropriate for a finding that someone is an alleged victim. 215 Findings
made under a higher standard would risk lending credence to a pretense that
the alleged victim is in reality an actual victim before there is proof beyond
reasonable doubt at the end of a trial. This suggestion may comport with the
Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision in Lubanga Dyilo, where the Court set a
relatively low burden of proof to authorize victim participation in investigation
proceedings with “the grounds to believe” that someone is a victim. 216 But the
Chamber did not define the victim litigants as alleged victims, which could
lead to the aforesaid due process problems. 217
Further, an alleged victim could be referred to as a “private accuser” in
court. The adjective “private” would separate the person’s status from the
Prosecutor’s public mandate as a civil servant commissioned by the ICC
member states. The term “accuser” would reflect the notion that an alleged
victim is essentially another accuser in addition to the ICC Prosecutor. 218
Additionally, the degree of proof to establish that a crime occurred and that
someone is an actual victim would be evidence beyond reasonable doubt. The
proposed rule would allow the burden of proof on these elements to be
satisfied by either the Prosecutor or the private accusers.
While these reforms could technically prevent the burden of proof from
shifting to the defense, they could also mend problems with the presumption of
innocence. The Pre-Trial Chamber was correct in holding that victim
participation cannot be an outright violation of the presumption of innocence
because this would signify that the Statute and Rules’ procedural framework is
“an infringement per se” of the presumption. 219 However, even though victim

215. Several statutory sections already employ a “reasonable basis” standard. See ICC
Statute, supra note 1, at arts. 15, 18, 53.
216. See Hemptinne & Rindi, supra note 67, at 345.
217. See Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, ICC-01/04-101, Decision on the
Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of VPRS 1, VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4, VPRS 5
and VPRS 6 (Jan. 17, 2006).
218. One can argue that there is no need for a private accuser, as the prosecution will
necessarily try to prove that the alleged victim is a true victim. Even though the goals of
prosecutors and private accusers will indeed often be identical, it will not always be the case. A
prosecutor may believe that there are victims, although he may not believe that a particular person
is a victim. As a private accuser, such a person could make his case independently of the
prosecutor’s wishes, pursuant to a judge finding that there is a reasonable basis for him to enter
the proceedings. The private accuser could also act on his own behalf if he has a strategic
disagreement with the prosecutor, or if the latter is more preoccupied with securing the
defendant’s conviction than with adducing evidence of reparations for victims.
219. Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-01/06-489, Decision on
Second Defence Motion for Leave to Appeal (Sept. 28, 2006) at 10.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2007]

RIGHTS OF VICTIMS AND DEFENDANTS AT THE ICC

283

participation may not inherently violate the presumption of innocence, it could
severely undermine it insofar as victim litigants are treated as actual victims
but not as alleged victims.
Whereas this author’s suggested reforms would redefine the status of
victims as mere private accusers, they would expand the rights of victims in
other respects. As previously noted, in continental Europe, the traditional role
for victims in criminal proceedings is as civil claimants. 220 Participation is
often restricted to establishing a claim for compensation due to financial or
emotional harm, as the responsibility to prove criminal guilt lies with the
public prosecutor. 221 However, since reparations are contingent on a
defendant’s conviction, the ICC should allow private accusers to argue the
defendant’s guilt in and of itself. If alleged victims are allowed to participate,
they should also logically be allowed to try and prove the defendant’s guilt.
The victim’s role would be analogous to that of a private prosecutor, who may
operate alongside a public prosecutor at trial in many European countries.
The ICC could benefit from allowing victims to play such a role.
European inquisitorial criminal justice systems have taken commendable steps
to limit prosecutorial discretion. 222 Allowing alleged victims to prosecute
cases may reflect a progressive notion that crime should no longer be
perceived as a mere intrusion on public order, nor should the state be solely
responsible for seeking redress. 223 Because crimes are hostile acts by
individuals against each other, victims should also play an active role in
obtaining justice. 224 However, the private prosecutor’s role should be adapted
to ICC proceedings. While many European countries allow alleged victims to
privately prosecute defendants without the involvement of any public
prosecutor (although the latter can intervene to dismiss the case), this
procedure would not be suitable for the ICC, at least because it would
presumably lead a host of alleged victims to bring private prosecutions. The
ICC is a relatively small court with a limited number of judges, and it could
not endure such a high caseload. So an alleged victim should only be allowed
to privately prosecute an individual if the ICC Prosecutor is already handling
the case. 225 In any case, granting victims such a right would not be a material
difference from the status quo, which already tends to allow victims to

220. BRIENEN & HOEGEN, supra note 26, at 27.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 15-16.
223. Id. at 30-31.
224. Id.
225. Even when the ICC prosecutor decides to bring the case, a risk would remain that an
unmanageable number of alleged victims would try to enter the proceedings. The risk could be
overcome by ensuring that one lawyer act on their behalf. Insofar as conflicts of interests would
exist between the alleged victims, separate lawyers could possibly assume their representation.
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participate in the proceedings. 226 This reform would just ensure that they have
the right to make arguments or introduce evidence supporting the defendant’s
guilt.
Hence, there are laudable aspects to alleged victims playing an important
role in proceedings but only so long as their participation does not undermine
defendants’ rights. By drawing the line between an alleged victim and an
actual victim, the proposed reforms could technically allow alleged victims to
participate without violating defendants’ rights.
VII. PREDICTABLE COUNTER-ARGUMENTS TO THE PROPOSED REFORMS
This author’s arguments calling for reforms to the ICC Statute and Rules
will likely face the three following predictable counterarguments. First, the
proposed reforms will grant excessive rights to defendants and thereby create a
nearly unattainable bar for convicting persons guilty of genocide, crimes
against humanity, and war crimes. This position shall be referred to as the
“excessive rights argument.” Second, the call for reforms are much a-do about
nothing because it is unreasonably far-fetched to posit that the ICC could
deprive defendants of a fair trial marked by due process of law, as the ICC
exemplifies rigorous international norms and standards on the administration
of justice. This is the “much a-do about nothing argument.” Third, the
reforms are not called for because they will protect defendants at the expense
of the victims’ fundamental right to participate in the proceedings. This is the
“victims’ rights argument.” These counterarguments are addressed in turn.
A.

The Excessive Rights Argument

The excessive rights argument would stress the following points: The
proposed reforms are pointless because virtually all defendants are guilty
anyway, even if they are not guilty of every technical count. The ICC already
grants defendants adequate protections. 227 Giving defendants even stronger
rights will create unnecessary hurdles in the work of the ICC Prosecutor and
other law enforcement authorities who have worked conscientiously to arrest
defendants and bring them to trial. If lofty philosophical principles or
misplaced sympathy lead to excessive rights for defendants, the bar for
conviction will be raised so high that numerous guilty persons will be
acquitted. In the end, impunity will prevail, thereby defeating the ICC’s
purpose.
Before rebutting this argument, it is necessary to concede that there is truth
to the contention that the handful of people who are charged with genocide,
crimes against humanity, and war crimes are virtually always found guilty.

226. ICC Statute, supra note 1, at art. 68.
227. See id. at arts. 66, 67.
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This is evidenced by examining the differences between ordinary prosecutions
for common crimes and high-profile international prosecutions for ICC-type
crimes.
Ordinary criminal cases typically involve a limited number of perpetrators
and victims and often only one defendant and one victim. 228 There is usually
some doubt—perhaps reasonable doubt—about the perpetrators’ identity. The
criminal process therefore largely serves to determine who committed the
crime. After a crime is reported, the police investigate the case and eventually
arrest a suspect. If prosecutors decide to charge the suspect with a crime, he
then becomes a defendant. He subsequently stands trial, during which the trier
of fact (judge or jury) determines whether he is guilty as charged in light of the
evidence. Accordingly, except in cases where the defendant is convicted
pursuant to a plea-bargaining agreement, the criminal trial has an essential
fact-finding purpose to determine whether the accused is actually guilty or
innocent, and it is often uncertain whether the defendant will be convicted at
all.
Conversely, high-profile international prosecutions dealing with genocide,
crimes against humanity, and war crimes usually focus on wide scale atrocities
that have been committed by numerous perpetrators against hundreds or
thousands of victims. The identity of the average perpetrator is difficult to
determine, as many random soldiers or civilians have partaken in gratuitous
killings, punitive expeditions, mob actions, and other abuses. Yet, there is
usually little doubt about the chief culprits’ identities, as they are persons who
ranked high in the chain of command and either directed or deliberately
condoned atrocities. These are the persons who are likely to be targeted by
prosecutors, who have insufficient time and resources to investigate and
prosecute every crime, especially in light of the high number of overall
perpetrators. Because prosecutors in high-profile international criminal cases
usually only target a few political or military leaders who are “the worst of the
worst,” virtually everyone knows that the defendants are going to be found
guilty. For instance, in light of the atrocities committed by the Serbian forces
during the Wars of Yugoslav Succession, nobody can reasonably argue that
then-president, Slobodan Milosevic, and his key commanders were completely
innocent of war crimes. 229 Similarly, no reasonable person would argue that

228. Even the extraordinary case of the serial killer is incomparable to international criminal
trials involving hundreds or thousands of victims.
229. This article devotes much attention to the case of the late Slobodan Milosevic. It
therefore focuses on the exception and not the norm, as he was only one man out of the 161
individuals indicted at the ICTY. Yet, his case merits close attention because of its important
political ramifications, as shall later be demonstrated. Further, use of Milosevic’s example must
not obviate the reality that crimes were committed by all camps involved in the Wars of Yugoslav
Succession. See United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Key
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Saddam Hussein and his close aides were fully innocent of gross human rights
violations during Hussein’s tenure as President of Iraq from 1979 to 2003.
There is virtually no doubt that the courts will find these types of defendants
guilty. This is especially true in light of the damning evidence against them
and the vast number of crimes committed, which allow prosecutors to
selectively press charges for those crimes that are particularly likely to result in
guilty verdicts. In the end, the courts may not find the defendants guilty on
every charge, but the defendants will surely be found guilty of some egregious
crimes, especially if the courts are free from corruption or undue influence.
Accordingly, one may argue that in high-profile international criminal
cases, the purpose of the criminal process is not to conduct a fact-finding
inquiry to discover the culprits’ identities, as there is no question that the
defendants are culpable. This argument should not be misconstrued as
contending that the criminal process in high-profile international prosecutions
is futile. The fact-finding inquiry remains important as a means of establishing
legal proof of guilt, such as by demonstrating exactly how the defendant
committed the crime or assisted others in its perpetration. It is necessary for
international prosecutions to painstakingly follow all the steps of the criminal
process. But that does not change the fact that we can correctly expect the
overwhelming majority of the defendants to be found guilty.
This argument is supported by an examination of the outcomes of cases
tried by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).
Established by the UN Security Council in 1993, the ICTY has tried persons
accused of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other serious
violations of international humanitarian law during the Wars of Yugoslav
Succession. 230 As illustrated in Table 1, a total of 161 persons have been
indicted at the ICTY. 231 Out of fifty-six cases completed through appeal so
far, only five defendants have been acquitted on all counts. 232 Since three
Figures of ICTY Cases, http://www.un.org/icty/cases-e/factsheets/procfact-e.htm (last visited
Sept. 2, 2007).
230. United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, General
Information, http://www.un.org/icty/cases-e/factsheets/generalinfo-e.htm (last visited April 13,
2007).
231. United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Key Figures
of ICTY Cases, supra note 229. Although ICTY prosecutors have only indicted 161 individuals
among thousands involved in committing atrocities, some commentators have argued that far
fewer persons should have been indicted. Some observers decried the low profile of many
indictees and questioned the wisdom of spending millions of dollars to try prison guards at the
world's most expensive criminal court. Ana Uzelac, Hague Prosecutors Rest Their Case,
INSTITUTE FOR WAR AND PEACE REPORTING, Dec. 27, 2004, available at
http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/tribunals/yugo/2004/1227rest.htm (last visited April 13,
2007).
232. United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Key Figures
of ICTY Cases, supra note 229.
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defendants were acquitted on appeal, this signifies that fifty-four out of fiftysix trials resulted in guilty verdicts. 233 Thus, the Trial Chamber has been
overwhelmingly likely to find defendants guilty. Appellate review was also
prone to deny significant relief to convicted defendants, as only three out of
fifty-four trial convictions were vacated on appeal. 234 Of course, many cases
are still at the pre-trial stage, and several trials have not yet been concluded.
Additionally, there have been twenty-five withdrawn indictments. 235 Yet,
precedents suggest very high odds that defendants tried at the ICTY will be
convicted. 236
On the other hand, any contention that the ICTY’s high conviction rate
demonstrates biases against defendants can be rebutted by the fact that
defendants have been vested with significant due process rights. 237 The high
conviction rate is not necessarily caused by any biases against defendants.
Under Occam’s Razor—“All other things being equal, the simplest explanation
tends to be the best”—the reason why the conviction rate is so high may
simply be that defendants are indeed virtually always guilty. As formerly
argued, prosecutors in ICTY cases will focus their time and resources on
targeting a relatively small number of perpetrators who bear the greatest
criminal responsibility for the widespread abuses committed during the Wars
of Yugoslav Succession. The principal reason why few defendants have been
acquitted could be that prosecutors carefully investigated cases and declined to
pursue suspects who would probably be found not guilty.

233. Id.
234. Id.; see also Stephen Castle, War Crimes Court Reverses Convictions of Bosnians, THE
INDEPENDENT, Oct. 24, 2001, available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/tribunals/2001/
2410.htm (last visited April 13, 2007).
235. United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Key Figures
of ICTY Cases, supra note 229. Withdrawn indictments are analogous to acquittals insofar as the
prosecutor withdrew the charges because he determined that the defendant was either innocent or
there was insufficient proof of guilt. But if there was no basis for a conviction, the prosecutor
should not have indicted the defendant. So a withdrawn indictment is still vastly distinguishable
from an acquittal by the court pursuant to a contested trial.
236. This high conviction rate is not extraordinary. For instance, the odds that a defendant
will be convicted at trial in the United States are quite high. See Bureau of Justice Statistics,
Compendium of Federal Justice Statistics, 2003, (U.S. Department of Justice 2003) at 2.
237. See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, S.C. Res.
827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 19, 2003) at art. 21.
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TABLE 1: KEY FIGURES OF ICTY CASES 238
ICTY Case Status

Cases

Acquitted at trial

2

Acquitted on appeal

3

Convicted

51

TOTAL CASES COMPLETED THROUGH APPEAL

56

TOTAL CONVICTED PENDING APPEAL

11

Withdrawn indictment before commencement of
proceedings

20

Withdrawn indictment after commencement of proceedings

5

TOTAL WITHDRAWN INDICTMENTS

25

Defendant died before commencement of proceedings

7

Defendant died after commencement of proceedings

4

TOTAL DEAD DEFENDANTS

11 239

TOTAL DEFENDANTS TRANSFERRED TO NATIONAL
COURTS

13

TOTAL DEFENDANTS AT LARGE

4

TOTAL DEFENDANTS IN PRE-TRIAL OR TRIAL
PROCEEDINGS

41

TOTAL INDICTMENTS

161

Nevertheless, focusing on the overall conviction rate could obscure
subtleties in conviction patterns, as certain defendants have been convicted on
some counts but acquitted on others. For instance, Goran Jelisic was convicted
of war crimes and crimes against humanity but acquitted of genocide, in spite
of his role in the brutalization or murder of an estimated thousands of Bosnian
Muslims and Croats at a concentration camp. 240
Further, the high conviction rate does not reflect the fact that prosecutors
have sometimes faced serious challenges to prove a defendant’s guilt. For
instance, many commentators believe that Milosevic would have been
238. United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Key Figures
of ICTY Cases, supra note 229.
239. In addition, Milan Babić and Miroslav Deronjić died while serving their sentences. Id.
240. Stacy Sullivan, Milosevic and Genocide: Has the Prosecution Made the Case?, FOREIGN
POLICY IN FOCUS, Feb. 19, 2004, at 2, available at http://www.irc-online.org/fpif/pdf/gac/
0402milosevic.pdf (last visited April 13, 2007).
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acquitted of genocide if his trial had been completed 241 before his death. 242
After the prosecution rested its case in February 25, 2004, Carla Del Ponte, the
head prosecutor, admitted that specific intent to commit genocide is hard to
prove and stated: “I know that I don’t have the smoking gun in the count of
genocide” against Milosevic. 243 Milosevic could still have been convicted of
complicity to commit genocide, a lesser offense, as evidence suggested that he
knew that genocide was underway and aided and abetted its commission. 244
Milosevic should also have been convicted of crimes against humanity and war
crimes. 245 Nevertheless, an acquittal on genocide would have been all over the
headlines.
Any shortcomings by prosecutors at the ICTY could be partly attributable
to “good lawyering” for defendants, who are generally defended by elite
lawyers. Even Milosevic, who had a law degree 246 and acted essentially as his
own lawyer, managed to score points in his defense case. 247 He conducted the
skillful cross-examination of key witnesses like Mahmut Bakalli, an Albanian
politician, who unconvincingly contended that he was unaware of any arms
trafficking in Kosovo. 248 Aside from his courtroom defense, an acquittal on
genocide for Milosevic could have been the product of more sinister actions he
may have undertaken before he was even indicted by the ICTY. As the
Yugoslav head of state from 1989 to 2000, Milosevic conceivably could have
ensured that any evidence documenting a genocide plan would be destroyed.
Although this has not been proven, the possibility of such schemes to destroy
evidence in the case of Milosevic and other defendants should permeate the
analysis of the ICTY’s verdicts.
Accordingly, in high-profile cases like Milosevic’s, guilt is not easy to
establish, especially if the prosecution must prove guilt by command
responsibility, which generally requires documentary or testimonial evidence
demonstrating the intent for subordinates to commit genocide and other
atrocities. Naturally, one may argue that this does not change the gist of the
excessive rights argument: the proposed reforms to the victim standing rule are

241. Id.
242. Marlise Simons & Alison Smale, Slobodan Milosevic, 64, Former Yugoslav Leader
Accused of War Crimes, Dies, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2006, at 34.
243. Bruce Wallace, Prosecution in Milosevic Trial Rests Case Early, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 26,
2004, at A3.
244. Sullivan, supra note 240, at 4.
245. Id. at 1.
246. WARREN ZIMMERMAN, ORIGINS OF A CATASTROPHE: YUGOSLAVIA AND ITS
DESTROYERS 20 (2d ed. 1999).
247. See Jon Silverman, Milosevic Shines as Lawyer, B.B.C. NEWS, Feb. 19, 2002, available
at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/1830203.stm (last visited April 13, 2007).
248. Id.
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pointless because virtually all defendants are guilty anyway, even if they are
not guilty of every technical count.
The rationale behind the excessive rights argument is that victim
participation is not outcome-changing because virtually all defendants would
still be convicted of at least one count even if the victims did not participate. 249
But this rationale is flawed. Even at the ICTY, some defendants have been
acquitted on all counts. 250 Since we cannot know in advance which defendants
will be found innocent, we should not let unfair procedures infect any
defendant’s trial and therefore risk that he would be convicted and imprisoned
on an improper basis. Utilitarian considerations should not offset the
guarantee of individual rights that the ICC provides to every defendant. The
Statute and Rules do not permit a utilitarian balancing test weighing a
defendant and a victim’s interests against each other. Article 68 § 3 bars any
victim participation that is “prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the
accused to a fair and impartial trial.” 251 Even if many genuine victims would
benefit from the victim standing rule, the ICC should not risk convicting an
innocent person due to the unfair prejudice that the rule could create.
A utilitarian approach would likewise ignore the importance of every count
in an indictment. Just because a defendant will surely be convicted of some
counts does not mean that the ICC should disregard whether unfair prejudice
will lead him to be improperly convicted of other counts for which he is
innocent. The excessive rights argument reflects disregard for the rule of law
since all counts matter, especially when someone is charged with extremely
grave deeds like genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes. Even if a
defendant will inevitably be incarcerated on one count, his conviction on an
additional count will generally result in a harsher sentence, thereby violating
the defendant’s rights if conviction on the additional count was improper. 252
Respecting the inalienable dignity of an individual entails being mindful of
the truth of what he did and did not do. We should not jump to the conclusion
that guilt for one crime means guilt for another, as legal rigor precludes such
unsubstantiated assumptions. Even though Milosevic undeniably had a lot of
blood on his hands, that does not mean he committed genocide, which is
perhaps the most horrible crime known to mankind. Whereas some critics like
human rights advocate Samantha Power have argued that Milosevic’s likely
acquittal for genocide would mean that the ICTY has created unattainable

249. United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Key Figures
of ICTY Cases, supra note 229.
250. Id.
251. ICC Statute, supra note 1, at art. 68 § 3.
252. See ICC Statute, supra note 1, at art. 78 § 3. Unfair prejudice caused by victim
participation may also lead the defendant to receive a harsher sentence on the one count on which
he was surely going to be convicted.
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standards for conviction, 253 this claim is contradicted by the overwhelming
majority of guilty verdicts handed down by the Court. 254 All trials have an
important fact-finding purpose, and guilt must be established under the
applicable standard of proof if a court is to have legitimacy. But this can only
happen if we preserve each defendant’s due process safeguards, thereby
justifying the proposed reforms to the ICC’s victim standing rule.
In spite of all these considerations, the excessive rights argument may
serve as the chief basis for opposition to amending the victim standing rule.
The provisions enabled by the Rome Statute were the product of zealous
negotiations and reluctant compromises conducted over years and years by the
representatives of a host of countries separated by different cultures, histories,
legal traditions, and geopolitical interests. 255
Reaching the necessary
consensus to amend the Court’s procedures could be at least as challenging.
Thus, the member states may be tepid or hostile to proposals for amending the
victim standing rule to provide greater rights to defendants, especially if they
feel that the Statute and Rules already sufficiently protect defendants. Hence,
the excessive rights argument may amount to a statement about the difficult
political feasibility of amending the rule. Yet, even if the benefits of an
amendment are unrealizable, an adequate interpretation of the rule would be
equally beneficial.
B.

The Much A-Do About Nothing Argument

The much a-do about nothing argument is as follows: It is utterly unlikely
that defendants will face unfair prejudice while tried at the ICC, which
comports with rigorous international norms and standards on the
administration of justice. ICC judges are among the greatest jurists in the
world, and they have the experience, knowledge, and professionalism to
administer proceedings so as to avoid any unfair prejudice—no matter how
unpopular the defendant or how heinous the charged offense may be. 256 The
ICC is meant to be a model of justice for the world to follow and will therefore
operate under tremendous scrutiny by political leaders, the media, and the
general public. For all these reasons, it is unfathomable that any defendant at

253. Sullivan, supra note 240, at 1.
254. United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Key Figures
of ICTY Cases, supra note 229.
255. Hans Corell, Legal Counsel of the United Nations, Address at Training Course on the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Evaluating the ICC Regime: The Likely Impact
on States and International Law 4-5 (Dec. 21, 2000), available at http://untreaty.un.org/
ola/media/info_from_lc/romestatute_dec00.pdf (last visited April 15, 2007).
256. See International Criminal Court, The Judges—Biographical Notes, http://www.icccpi.int/chambers/judges.html (last visited April 15, 2007).
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the ICC will be deprived of his right to a fair trial marked by due process of
law.
This is a cogent argument insofar as it posits that the ICC will not
deliberately or gratuitously violate defendants’ rights. It is undeniable that the
Court’s Statute and Rules generally guarantee due process and fairness to all
defendants, thereby comporting with international norms and standards for
criminal trials. It is also true that ICC judges have the savvy to administer
proceedings in a just manner. The ICC is indeed a model of justice for the
world and is far removed from the unfairness of victor’s justice. Nevertheless,
there are significant flaws with the much a-do about nothing argument.
First, a court can violate a defendant’s rights even if it sincerely desires to
administer a fair trial. This is particularly likely to happen when the court must
apply laws that are unfairly prejudicial to a defendant. Since judges will have
little choice but to apply the victim standing rule, unfair prejudice might occur
regardless of their intentions. Thus, even with all the goodwill in the world,
the ICC could deprive defendants of their right to a fair trial marked by due
process of law.
Second, it is not unfathomable that ICC judges could sometimes fail to be
impartial in spite of the Court’s mission and intense public scrutiny. Initially,
it must be noted that bias against criminal defendants is commonplace. Of
course, the general public often thinks that if someone has been arrested for
murder, assault, or rape, he is probably not a “choir-boy.” By the same token,
the general public is inclined to think that if a defendant is one of the few
persons facing a high-profile trial for genocide, crimes against humanity, war
crimes, and other abuses involving hundreds or thousands of victims, he
probably has blood on his hands. Of course, when it comes to the guilt or
innocence of a defendant, there are significant differences between the views
of the general public and the impartial, sophisticated positions judges are
usually able to attain. Yet, judges are human beings too, and their decisions
are sometimes affected by biases against defendants. Although quite
imponderable, judicial bias may occur when judges have to deal with a
defendant who appears utterly unsympathetic. Consider a defendant, who acts
in an unruly manner in court, is being tried for extremely heinous crimes, and
is perceived as guilty by the vast majority of top political leaders, the media,
and the general public. Enter Slobodan Milosevic.
While on trial at the ICTY, Milosevic acted as a grand provocateur with
his uncouth demeanor and his frequent questioning of the Court’s power to try
him. On his first appearance, Milosevic expressly refused to acknowledge the
Court’s authority and stated that “[his] trial’s aim is to produce false
justification for the war crimes of NATO committed in Yugoslavia.” 257 He
257. Milosevic Hearing Transcript, B.B.C. NEWS, July 3, 2001,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1419971.stm (last visited April 15, 2007).
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also described his trial as “an evil and hostile action aimed at justifying the
crimes committed against my country.” 258 For instance, he argued that the
massacre of over 8,000 Muslim men and boys at Srebrenica in 1995 was a
conspiracy conducted by French spies and the Bosnian Muslim government. 259
These allegations caused tremendous uproar, as the conventional idea among
Westerners is that Serbs were responsible for the Wars of Yugoslav Succession
due to nationalist politics meant to create a “Greater Serbia” under the pretense
of self-defense. 260 For instance, Warren Zimmermann, the last American
ambassador to Yugoslavia, has criticized Serbs for historically defining
themselves as victims of both Western powers and their non-Serb neighbors. 261
Milosevic has indeed stated that his trial is “an attempt to turn the victim into
the culprit.” 262 He and his supporters believe that the Serbs’ participation in
the wars was mere self-defense against Slovenes, Croats, Muslim
fundamentalists, and Kosovar terrorists who were all supported by NATO in
their efforts to either oppress Serbs or unlawfully secede from a fraternal
federal state of Yugoslavia. 263 At the ICTY, Milosevic argued that NATO
“supported a totalitarian chauvinist elite, terrorists, Islamic fundamentalists,
neo-Nazis whose objective was an ethnically pure state, that is to say a state
without any Serbs.” 264 Milosevic’s contemptuous tirades questioning the
Court’s legitimacy and denouncing an anti-Serb conspiracy contributed to
several spats between Milosevic and Presiding Judge Richard May. 265
Milosevic’s trial strategy was criticized for relying on obstructionist
methods serving to unduly delay the conclusion of his trial. 266 Milosevic

258. Milosevic, Calling Himself Victim, Asks to Be Freed by Court, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan.
30, 2002, available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/tribunals/2002/0131nyt.htm (last
visited April 15, 2007).
259. Milosevic Says Srebrenica ‘Made Up,’ B.B.C. NEWS, Sept. 27, 2002, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2284777.stm (last visited April 15, 2007).
260. Toby Sterling, After Delays, Milosevic Opens Defense: Former Yugoslav Leader Shifts
Blame for Atrocities, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 1, 2004, at A11, available at
http://www.genocidewatch.org/FrmYugoAfterDelaysMilosevicOpensDefense1sept2004.htm (last
visited April 15, 2007).
261. WARREN ZIMMERMAN, ORIGINS OF A CATASTROPHE: YUGOSLAVIA AND ITS
DESTROYERS—AMERICA’S LAST AMBASSADOR TELLS WHAT HAPPENED AND WHY 12-14
(1996).
262. Milosevic, Calling Himself a Victim, Asks to Be Freed by Court, supra note 258.
263. Milosevic Launches Trial Defense, B.B.C. NEWS, Aug. 31, 2004, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3613020.stm (last visited April 15, 2007).
264. Id.
265. Chris Morris, Sparks Fly at Milosevic Grand Slam, B.B.C. NEWS, Oct. 5, 2002,
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/from_our_own_correspondent/2301993.stm
(last visited April 15, 2007); Milosevic Hearing Transcript, B.B.C. NEWS, supra note 263.
266. Marlise Simons, U.N. Court Faces Fairness Issue at Milosevic Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
4, 2005, at A10.
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initially moved to call 1,631 witnesses, which was over five times more than
the number called by the prosecution. 267 The witness list included former
American President Bill Clinton and former British Prime Minister Tony Blair
so Milosevic could question them about what he believed was a NATO
conspiracy to break up Yugoslavia and harm Serbs. 268 After presenting his
first 40 witnesses, Milosevic conceded to call “only” 199 more witnesses,
which he described as “the absolute minimum.” 269 This defense strategy
precluded him from keeping up with the trial schedule. 270 Even though
Milosevic’s trial ended with his death, it began in February 2002 and was the
longest international trial in history. 271 Delays were also caused by
Milosevic’s poor health, as doctors concluded he needed extended rest periods.
This was particularly problematic since Milosevic acted as his own lawyer. 272
His Serbian lawyers only assisted him outside the courtroom, and he
obstinately refused to consort with two British lawyers appointed by the Court
to defend him. 273
Milosevic was therefore not in the Court’s good graces. Naturally, these
tensions may not have led to judicial bias depriving Milosevic of his right to a
fair trial. Even so, a basic point can be drawn from Milosevic’s case.
Prosecutions for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other
gross atrocities involve intense emotions. Of course, emotions do not consist
exclusively of outbursts such as Milosevic’s. Emotions can also be more
subtly internalized in our psyche. In a criminal trial, emotions often translate
into conscious or subconscious feelings of sympathy or antipathy towards a
defendant or a victim. Of course, judges have the duty to detach themselves
from emotions so that they can rationally decide issues without any bias or
unfair prejudice. But it is unrealistic to expect that judges can always be
totally impassive to emotion, especially in high-profile international
prosecutions characterized by the unspeakable enormity of atrocities wrought
on victims, extreme unpopularity of defendants, critical political stakes, and
intense media coverage.
Numerous ICC cases will likely be characterized by the same factors that
have made Milosevic’s trial so emotional. But ICC cases will also have to
handle victim participation, whereas the ICTY does not give victims standing
to participate throughout proceedings. Under these circumstances, it is
267. Milosevic Files Witness Wish List, B.B.C. NEWS, Apr. 14, 2004, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/ hi/europe/3623985.stm (last visited April 15, 2007).
268. Id.
269. Simons, U.N. Court Faces Fairness Issue at Milosevic Trial, supra note 266, at A10.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Marlise Simons, Citing New Medical Report, Milosevic's Lawyers Urge Postponement in
War Crimes Trial, N.Y. TIMES, November 13, 2005, at 22.
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difficult to imagine that victim involvement will not exacerbate the inherent
emotional nature of the proceedings. Judge Claude Jorda, former ICTY Judge
and President, as well as former Presiding Judge in the ICC’s Pre-Trial
Chamber, and Jérôme de Hemptinne, the ICTY’s Legal Officer, have
recognized the possibility that ICC judges may be biased against the accused if
the judges read the preliminary statements of victims before trial. 274 The
victims’ presence, and possible emotional behavior, could lead judges to
sympathize with them and antagonize defendants. Even if the victims
themselves are not present in court, their lawyers will describe the harm they
allegedly suffered due to the defendants’ actions, which could lead judges to
side with the victims, especially since judges could generally consider them to
be true victims pursuant to granting their application to enter the
proceedings—again before proof beyond reasonable doubt has established that
a crime occurred and that they are actual victims. Unless the ICC adopts the
panglossian notion that everything will always be for the best in its
proceedings; it should consider that the risk of judicial bias, even by wellintentioned and eminently qualified judges, accentuates the need for an
adequate procedure to reconcile the conflicting rights of victims and
defendants.
C. The Victims’ Rights Argument
The victims’ rights argument revolves around these points: By seeking to
either undercut the victim standing rule or eliminate it altogether, the proposed
reforms will improperly protect defendants at the expense of the victims. All
victims must be allowed to vindicate their interests by fully participating
throughout judicial proceedings. Whereas the ICC already grants adequate
rights to defendants, 275 the proposed reforms evince greater concern for the
well-being of criminals than for the victims’ moral need for justice.
More specifically, Marion Brienen and Ernestine Hoegen, who are victims’
rights advocates, contend that treating persons as alleged victims only adds
insult to injury since it reflects a lack of respect for victims’ suffering. 276 In
discussing European criminal justice reform, they argue in favor of the
presumption of truth of a person’s claim that he is a victim. 277 They further
posit that a presumption of truth for a victim does not compromise the
defendant’s presumption of innocence. 278
At the outset, this author must emphasize that the reforms proposed in this
article do not reflect a lack of preoccupation for victims’ need for justice.

274.
275.
276.
277.
278.

Jorda & Hemptinne, supra note 21, at 1413.
See ICC Statute, supra note 1, at art. 67.
BRIENEN & HOEGEN, supra note 26, at 285.
Id. at 30.
Id. at 285-86.
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Victims should unequivocally have the right to participate in reparation
proceedings and in non-judicial forums. However, they should not participate
in court proceedings as actual victims until it has, at least, been proven beyond
reasonable doubt that a crime occurred and that they are victims. Requiring
use of the denomination “alleged victim” or “private accuser” until proof has
been made is not a sign of disrespect for the victims’ suffering. Legal terms
must always take into account what has been established or not, which is a
principle espoused by the ICC Statute and Rules in referring to defendants. 279
Moreover, no legal system can fully recognize a presumption of truth for
both an alleged victim and a defendant because the presumptions are
irreconcilable. In most cases, the alleged victim will allege, “the defendant
committed a crime against me,” and the defendant will contend, “the victim is
not telling the truth.” The law cannot presume that such mutually-exclusive
claims are both true. The presumption of innocence not only presumes that the
defendant is not the culprit; it also presumes that elements of a crime are not
proved until they are actually proved beyond reasonable doubt. 280 Again, two
of these elements are that: 1) a crime occurred; and 2) there are victims.
Part of the problem behind Brienen and Hoegen’s argument is traceable in
their writing, which reflects a profound trust in the investigative authorities’
ability to systematically charge the right persons with the right crimes. Their
apparent conception that defendants are virtually always guilty precludes them
from viewing a criminal trial as a truth-finding inquiry meant to uncover
whether an accusation is truthful. Under such a conception, a trial is a mere
formality, and it is proper to let purported victims have their day in court even
if it is unfairly prejudicial to defendants. After all, if defendants are virtually
always guilty, one can argue that the benefits of victim participation outweigh
the costs of wrongfully convicting a small handful of innocents. But this
reverts to the type of balancing test that is not permitted at the ICC. Article 68
§ 3 stresses that victims do not have an absolute right to participate in
proceedings and that their rights are trumped by defendants’ rights. 281
Another problem with the victims’ rights argument is that it often reflects
the false assumption that participation in criminal proceedings is essential to
victims’ interests. In fact, criminal proceedings are not necessarily the best
means of protecting victims’ interests when compared to truth and

279. The Statute and Rules refer to a defendant as “the accused,” see, e.g., ICC Statute, supra
note 1, at art. 67; instead of terms like “the culprit” or “the perpetrator,” which would indicate a
presumption of guilt. In statutory sections relating to appeal or sentencing, the Statute and Rules
also appropriately refer to a defendant as “the convicted person” or “the sentenced person.” See,
e.g., id. at arts. 81, 106.
280. Id. at art. 66.
281. Id. at art. 68 § 3. Another evident limitation on victims’ rights is that they cannot
question a defendant who declines to testify. Id. at art. 67 § 1 (g).
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reconciliation commissions. Victims’ interests generally consist of: 1)
obtaining closure and truth about the political affairs behind their
victimization; 2) having a forum to speak and be heard; 3) receiving financial
compensation for their harm; and 4) seeing that culprits get retribution so long
as the punishment is reasonable. Except for the last category, truth and
reconciliation commissions may better serve victims than criminal
proceedings.
A criminal trial is largely a determination of the truth based on the findings
of investigative authorities and a defendant’s counter-arguments. A healthy
dose of cynicism regarding the capacity of trials to unearth the truth is
nonetheless appropriate. After all, the verdict of a criminal case is more a
measure of proof than of truth because an acquittal does not mean that a
defendant is innocent. It just means that the prosecution was unable to prove
guilt. Sometimes the truth will not come out because there is insufficient proof
to convict a person who actually was guilty. 282 In light of the threat of
imprisonment and a stiff fine, it is not surprising that most guilty defendants
adamantly deny all accusations and use every legal tactic to avoid conviction.
In addition to putting the accused on the defensive, the prospect of punishment
can lead national governments to obstruct the prosecution’s efforts to acquire
evidence of abuses when a guilty verdict could pave the way for hefty statepaid financial damages. For this reason, ICTY prosecutors have alleged that
Belgrade is doing everything it can to ensure that any evidence of genocidal
intent is kept secret. 283
The ICTY’s verdicts have had important political repercussions, as they
influenced conceptions of who was responsible for the Wars of Yugoslav

282. The outcome of a case will be an even greater measure of proof than of truth if the
defendant manages to shield relevant and reliable incriminating evidence from the eyes of the
trier of fact pursuant to an exclusionary rule. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that suppressing
evidence is the only means of deterring law enforcement authorities from violating defendants’
rights while seeking to amass proof of guilt. See generally Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
While statistics suggest that only a small proportion of prosecutions are dropped due to
suppression problems, the exclusionary rule is controversial partly because it obviates the truthfinding function of trials in favor of systemic deterrence of police overreaching. See generally
JOSHUA DRESSLER & GEORGE C. THOMAS, III, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: PRINCIPLES, POLICIES
AND PERSPECTIVES 465-510 (2d ed. 2003). However, the ICC is unlikely to regularly confront
these issues since it has narrower exclusionary procedures than American courts. For instance,
the ICC does not require that police provide suspects with self-incrimination warnings before
custodial interrogations (“You have the right to remain silent, etc.”), although the failure to give
such warnings often results in the suppression of an incriminating statement by a suspect under
American law. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Thus, the ICC may have a greater
truth-finding ability than American courts. Yet, the ICC’s ability to uncover the truth may be
hindered by another type of problem: the systematic destruction of evidence documenting
conspiracies to commit genocide or other wide-scale atrocities.
283. Sullivan, supra note 240, at 3.
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Succession and the ensuing atrocities, and whether responsible parties would
be held accountable. Some commentators argued that an acquittal on the
genocide charge for Milosevic would have had serious implications for future
attempts to prosecute genocide and to deter its occurrence. 284 It would also
have consternated victims and provided ammunition for those denying that
genocide was committed. 285 On the other hand, Milosevic’s conviction on the
genocide charge would have entered history books as “proof” that his regime
was criminal, which would have helped some victims turn the page and eased
the resentment of those who considered themselves to be Milosevic’s victims.
In order to estimate the dramatic impact that Milosevic’s acquittal or
conviction on the genocide charge would have had on politics in the Balkans if
he had not died before the end of his trial, 286 it is useful to consider the
reactions to the decision rendered by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in
a related case where Bosnia sued Serbia and Montenegro for genocide. 287
Whereas the ICJ is not a criminal court and therefore cannot judge and punish
individuals, the ICJ is responsible for adjudicating disputes between states. 288
In that capacity, the ICJ was called upon to decide whether the government of
Serbia and Montenegro was responsible for committing genocide against the
people of the state of Bosnia. 289 This was the first time in history where a state
sued another for genocide. 290 The ICJ held that Serbia was not directly
responsible for the genocide of nearly 8,000 Bosnian Muslims in 1995,
although it noted that Serbia “could and should” have prevented the killings as
the Genocide Convention requires, since the genocide was committed by
Bosnian Serb troops that had close links to the Serb government. 291 “A
minority of four judges found Serbia guilty of complicity in the genocide.”292
The outcome significantly favored Serbia, which was absolved of having to
pay substantial financial reparations that Bosnia had demanded. 293 Serbia will
nonetheless endure the stigma of being, at least in some measure, associated
with genocide. 294 Serbia had contended that it did not control events in Bosnia

284. Id. at 1.
285. Id.
286. Simons & Smale, supra note 242.
287. Sullivan, supra note 240, at 3; Marlise Simons, Court Still Weighing Genocide Case
From Milosevic Era, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2006, at A6.
288. See International Court of Justice, How the Court Works, http://www.icj-cij.org/court/
index.php?p1=1&p2=6 (last visited Aug. 27, 2007).
289. Marlise Simons, Mixed Ruling on Genocide Still Puts Pressure on Serbia, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 6, 2007, at A10.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id.
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and that a verdict for Bosnia would have further complicated reconciliation
between the neighbors, 295 although there is no reason to believe that the ICJ’s
ruling in favor of Serbia will in any way facilitate reconciliation. Indeed,
Bosnian Muslims angrily dismissed the ICJ’s ruling as a disgrace, 296 as Bosnia
had insisted that the ICJ’s recognition of Serbia’s responsibility for genocide
was more important than reparations. 297
For better or worse, the ICTY and ICJ’s verdicts will likely influence
politics for years to come in the historically unstable and war-prone Balkans.
Notably, certain international law experts described the ICJ’s decision as a
tactful political compromise. 298 Bosnians will be especially resentful insofar
as they believe that such a political compromise led the ICJ to rule in favor of
Serbia in the genocide case. 299 In turn, the ICC’s verdicts will also probably
have a significant influence over political affairs in conflict-prone societies.
Under these circumstances, the acquittal of guilty defendants due to their
resistance or to state obstruction would obviously frustrate victims’ attempts to
expose the truth about their suffering and to have the culprits’ officially
recognized, which could also lead victims to accuse the ICC of making
improper political compromises.
Victims may also become frustrated with the trial process. To many,
justice delayed is justice denied, especially if the verdict is anything less than a
finding of guilt on all counts. But proceedings in ICTR and ICTY cases have
often dragged on for months or years. 300 Victim participation could easily
make proceedings even longer at the ICC. Victim litigants or victims at large
will be annoyed with the wait, especially since their need for closure might not
be satisfied until cases’ outcomes are finite through appeal. These problems
will be compounded by the ICC’s location in The Hague, which will inevitably
appear remote to many victims in distant countries. The U.N. special tribunals
for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda are based in The Hague and in
Arusha, Tanzania, many miles away from the scene of the crimes they are

295. Simons, Court Still Weighing Genocide Case From Milosevic Era, supra note 287.
296. Simons, Mixed Ruling on Genocide Still Puts Pressure on Serbia, supra note 289.
297. Simons, Court Still Weighing Genocide Case From Milosevic Era, supra note 287.
298. Simons, Mixed Ruling on Genocide Still Puts Pressure on Serbia, supra note 289. The
ICJ largely based its ruling on documents that Serbia provided to the court only after Serbia had
redacted substantial passages that may well have established its direct responsibility for genocide.
But the court never pressed Serbia to provide the original documents, and rejected a Bosnian
request for these documents. Marlise Simons, Genocide Court Ruled For Serbia Without Seeing
Full War Archive, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2007, at A1.
299. Id.
300. United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Status of Cases,
http://www.ictr.org (last visited Sept. 13, 2007); United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia, Indictments and Proceedings, http://www.un.org/icty/casese/indictments-e.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2007).
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judging. 301 “[B]ecause the sessions are often tedious and rarely broadcast back
home, survivors, bystanders, and fellow perpetrators pay almost no attention.
(Contrast this with the Israelis glued to their radios during the 1961 trial of
Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem.)” 302
Criminal trials may consequently be unable to satisfy victims’ need for
truth and justice. Nevertheless, criminal trials, with all their underlying due
process guarantees, are the best means of finding the truth when the truth may
result in the accused being imprisoned or otherwise punished. However, in
cases where the international community is willing to sacrifice the possibility
of punishing the accused in exchange for greater truth, the international
community should consider foregoing criminal prosecutions in favor of
investigation by truth and reconciliation commissions. While the latter are
typically established by national governments, the United Nations has also
played a role in sponsoring commissions, such as in El Salvador. 303
“[E]merging principles of international law have recognized a right of victims
and their families to be apprised of the truth concerning human rights abuses
and a corresponding duty upon States to investigate and disseminate the
truth.” 304 This is particularly important to help provide closure to the victims
of abuses and facilitate transition into a stable post-conflict democracy. For
instance, a truth and reconciliation commission contributed to Chile’s
transition from the Pinochet dictatorship into a rather stable and prosperous
democracy. 305 In 1991, Chilean president Patricio Aylwin presented the
commission’s report on national television, publicly apologized to the victims,
and sent a copy of the report to each victimized family with a letter indicating
on what page information on the victims could be found. 306
Moreover, South Africa’s commission has unraveled much information by
eliciting admissions from perpetrators who would have denied all accusations
if they had faced the threat of criminal punishment. South Africa employed a
novel approach by granting its commission the power to issue an amnesty for

301. United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: General Information,
http://69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/geninfo/index.htm (last visited April 15, 2007); United Nations,
Fact Sheet on ICTY Proceedings: General Information, http://www.un.org/icty/cases-e/
factsheets/generalinfo-e.htm (last visited April 15, 2007).
302. Samantha Power, How to Try Saddam Hussein: Unpunishable, NEW REPUBLIC,
December 29, 2003, available at
http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/news/opeds/2003/power_hussein_tnr_122903.htm (last visited April
15, 2007).
303. See, e.g., Reed Brody, The United Nations and Human Rights in El Salvador’s
“Negotiated Revolution,” 8 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 153, 153-54 (1995).
304. Jason S. Abrams & Priscilla Hayner, Documenting, Acknowledging and Publicizing the
Truth, in POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE 283, 283 (Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2002).
305. Id. at 290-91.
306. Malcolm Coad, Chile Report Details 2,000 Deaths, THE GUARDIAN, March 5, 1991.
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individuals who acknowledged politically-motivated offenses. Over 7,500
perpetrators submitted applications for amnesty. 307 The admissions of
numerous perpetrators led the commission to find other perpetrators, who in
turn applied for amnesty in exchange for their own admissions. 308 In the end,
the process enabled the commission to elicit “dramatic admissions about the
apartheid regime’s abuses.” 309 The international community has lauded the
commission’s approach, although some South Africans felt that it enabled
abusers to have impunity. Insofar as the amnesty program was successful, it
was only so because the South African government was able to use the threat
of prosecution to encourage perpetrators to apply for amnesty and reveal their
wrongdoing. 310
Truth commissions can therefore effectively discover the truth about a
pattern of gross human rights abuses. Of course, the complete truth will not
always come out. Some offenders will be acquitted in criminal court, and
others will never admit to wrongdoing even if they are not prosecuted. But
there is a greater risk that the truth will not be uncovered when criminal
prosecutions are chosen instead of truth and reconciliation commissions. 311
That is the price to pay if the international community seeks to punish
someone.
In addition to better serving victims’ need for truth and closure,
commissions will provide a greater opportunity for victims to speak and be
heard than ICC proceedings. In a criminal trial, victims can only speak as
witnesses, but judges will only allow a limited number of victims to testify
about the harm the defendant caused them due to the requirement of a speedy
trial and the prohibition on cumulative evidence. Testifying victims will
additionally have to answer rather narrow questions related to specific legal
issues, instead of being able to vent all their thoughts and emotions about their
suffering. Conversely, commission hearings will allow numerous victims to
307. Abrams & Hayner, supra note 311, at 304.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id. The successes of the amnesty program have been mitigated by the South African
government’s unwillingness to prosecute persons who failed to apply for amnesty or fully
cooperate with the commission. Paul Van Zyl, Unfinished Business: The Truth and
Reconciliation Commission’s Contribution to Justice in Post-Apartheid South Africa, in POSTCONFLICT JUSTICE 745, 745 (Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2002).
311. It must nonetheless be underlined that the effectiveness of past truth commissions has
sometimes been limited by their status as non-permanent bodies. They are difficult and timeconsuming to assemble, and often do not have sufficient resources to investigate all abuses.
Abrams & Hayner, supra note 304, at 286-88. Accordingly, it is worth exploring the idea of a
permanent United Nations Truth and Reconciliation Commission with adequate staffing and
resources to tackle the numerous conflicts persisting in the world. The commission could even
work in unison with the ICC. If an accused person refused to comply with the commission’s
requests for truth, he could then be prosecuted at the ICC.
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appear and fully express their views, thereby serving as a superior forum than
the ICC for this purpose.
Additionally, victims might be more likely to receive financial
compensation at commissions than at the ICC. Punishment pursuant to a guilty
verdict at the ICC will take the form of either an order of financial
compensation to be paid by the defendant to the victim and/or imprisonment of
the defendant for a term of years. 312 However, due to practical limitations,
ordering defendants to pay financial compensation is unlikely to satisfy
victims’ needs. It has already been explained that the typical ICC case will
involve a handful of high-profile defendants and hundreds or even thousands
of victims of genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity. The sheer
contrast between the small number of defendants and the high number of
victims signifies that virtually no defendant will have the personal resources to
pay meaningful compensation to victims, especially considering the
monumental financial damages involved in ICC cases. While victims may be
pleased to see defendants lose all their assets as a result of an order of
compensation, victims will remain unsatisfied because they will not receive
any large sum from defendants. This is partly why the ICC realistically allows
damages to be paid through a special Trust Fund alimented by the member
states. 313 But the ICC will not allow financial compensation for offenses for
which a defendant is acquitted. 314 Compensation for the victim is therefore
contingent on the prosecution being able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that
a particular defendant committed a crime. Whereas victims at the ICC
probably will be compensated by the Trust Fund since it can be expected that
defendants typically will not be able to pay full damages, victims might be
more likely to receive these public funds from a U.N.-sponsored truth
commission than from the ICC. Indeed, a commission can formally recognize
someone as a victim pursuant to an investigation without having to first
establish that a particular individual is guilty of a crime beyond reasonable
doubt, which is a high burden of proof. A commission can even compensate a
victim if authorities have nobody to prosecute because the perpetrator is
unknown or at large. 315

312. ICC Statute, supra note 1, at art. 77. Note that financial compensation includes the
“forfeiture of proceeds, property and assets derived directly or indirectly from that crime, without
prejudice to the rights of bona fide third parties.” Id.
313. Id. at arts. 75, 79; see also ICC Rules, supra note 14, at 173-75; ICC Regulations, supra
note 10, at 88, 117.
314. ICC Statute, supra note 1, at art. 75 (referring to reparations “against a convicted
person”).
315. Judge Jorda has supported the creation of an independent commission to ensure that
victims actually receive compensation from the ICC Trust Fund when there is prima facie
evidence of harm, including when the accused are not arrested or the convicted are insolvent.
Jorda & Hemptinne, supra note 21, at 1415.
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Hence, a commission might better satisfy victims’ need for obtaining truth,
being heard, and receiving financial compensation than the ICC might be able
to. Advocates of victim participation in ICC proceedings may therefore have
promised victims more than what the Court can actually deliver. An ICC
prosecution may only provide greater satisfaction to victims insofar as they
wish for perpetrators to receive retributive punishment by imprisonment. To
many victims, this would understandably constitute a sufficient reason to
prefer that a perpetrator be prosecuted despite the risk of acquittal, instead of
him receiving amnesty pursuant to a truth and reconciliation process. After all,
commissions “cannot directly punish perpetrators, beyond stigmatizing them or
recommending non-criminal measures such as removal from positions in the
government or armed forces. Such sanctions seem a paltry substitute for trial
punishment where a person is personally responsible for atrocities of the
highest magnitude.” 316 The necessary compromise that commissions have
made for finding the truth has often been to forego prosecution altogether. 317
But ICC-type crimes must ordinarily be prosecuted in order to avoid impunity
for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. Whereas the deterrent
value of international prosecutions is perhaps imponderable, at least some
political and military leaders have realized that they may be brought to justice
if they go too far. The last decade has marked a new era in international justice
with the creation of the U.N. tribunals for Cambodia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone,
and the former Yugoslavia, as well as the ICC. The time may be over when a
brutal dictator like Mobutu Sese Seko could just move into a comfortable exile
and never be brought to justice. 318
Beside deterrence, one may feel that prosecuting mass abusers is a moral
obligation because it would be insufferable not to exert retribution on
individuals responsible for unspeakable atrocities. David Scheffer, who was
Ambassador at Large for War Crimes under the Clinton administration from
1997 to 2001, has stated:
Accountability is society’s collective judgment about how both to forgive and
to punish, in this case for crimes that directly assault humankind as a whole
and the very meaning of faith among the world’s leading religions. For these
crimes, the courtroom remains the great leveler, addressing both the
perpetrators and the victims through the revelation of the truth and also
through the knowledge that consequences flow from evil actions. 319

316. Abrams & Hayner, supra note 304, at 292.
317. Id. at 287.
318. Howard W. French, Mobutu Sese Seko, Zairian Ruler, Is Dead in Exile in Morroco at
66, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 1997, at A1.
319. David J. Scheffer, The Tool Box, Past and Present, of Justice and Reconciliation for
Atrocities, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 970, 977 (2001) (reviewing GARY JONATHAN BASS, STAY THE
HAND OF VENGEANCE: THE POLITICS OF WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS (2000)).
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The necessity of pursuing accountability through criminal prosecutions at
the ICC can still be reconciled with the establishment of truth commissions. A
commission’s purpose is far from synonymous with granting impunity to
perpetrators, as even in South Africa, fewer than 10% of the over 7,500
persons who applied for amnesty actually received it. 320 By submitting its
comprehensive investigative findings to executive officials, a commission may
actually facilitate prosecution, as was the case in Argentina, Chile, South
Africa, and Uganda. 321
In sum, truth and reconciliation commissions can generally far better
address victims’ needs than the ICC. Further, by focusing narrowly on the
importance of victims participating as litigants at the ICC, certain victim rights
advocates may have neglected the need to advocate for the creation of truth
and reconciliation commissions, and may have overlooked that the ICC and
such commissions can coexist and significantly complement each other.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The ICC is a long overdue and much-needed international institution that
will advance the interests of justice and human rights. Its victim standing rule
could nonetheless violate defendants’ rights because of procedural problems.
The rule is largely based on European criminal procedures, which are vastly
different from American criminal procedures. This article’s arguments could
therefore be misconstrued as evincing the conception that, by barring victim
participation, American procedures better protect defendants’ rights than
European procedures. However, there is little doubt that criminal defendants
fare much worse in America than in Europe.
America has by far the highest incarceration rate in the entire world, and a
far greater proportion of Americans are incarcerated than Europeans. 322 Life
sentences are constitutionally permissible for minor non-violent offenses. 323
Even teenagers commonly receive life sentences, a practice which is virtually
nonexistent in any other country. 324 On December 1, 2005, the 1,000th person

320. Van Zyl, supra note 310, at 753.
321. Id.; Abrams & Hayner, supra note 304, at 286-87.
322. Prison and Beyond: A Stigma that Never Fades, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 8, 2002,
available at http://www.economist.com/world/na/displayStory.cfm?story_id=1270755 (last
visited April 15, 2007).
323. In 1980, the Supreme Court held that Texas’ three-strikes law was not cruel and unusual,
thereby affirming the life sentence of a defendant who had been convicted of credit card fraud,
forgery, and theft. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980). The Court revisited the issue in
2003 and upheld California’s three strikes law. The defendant got a fifty-year sentence for
shoplifting videotapes worth $153.54 since he already had convictions for petty theft, burglary,
and transportation of marijuana. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003).
324. An estimated 2,200 persons in America are serving life without parole for crimes
committed before turning eighteen. More than 350 of them were fifteen or younger. The only
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was executed in America since the Supreme Court reauthorized capital
punishment in 1976, 325 although the death penalty has been abolished in law or
in practice by more than half of all countries, in conformance with the growing
international recognition of the death penalty as a human rights violation. 326
Further, indigent defendants in America are frequently appointed lawyers who
have neither the personal motivation nor financial incentives to represent
defendants zealously. 327 Systemic racial discrimination in sentencing has gone
ignored by legislators and the Supreme Court. 328
In sum, while America may be a model in other areas, its criminal justice
practices are far from exemplary. Whereas this paper may reflect arguments,
assumptions, and premises particular to American jurisprudence, it should not
be construed as positing that American or common law procedures are
necessarily superior to the European procedures that have served as a model
for the ICC’s victim standing rule. The purpose of this article is not to
compare European and American domestic practices. Instead, it is to analyze
the ICC victim standing rule, which will apply in the vastly different context of
high-profile international prosecutions with critical political implications and a
non-negligible emotional dimension. Under these circumstances, victim
participation could prove unfairly prejudicial to defendants, especially
considering the deficiencies of the Court’s Statute and Rules when it comes to
concretely defining the nature of victim standing. But yet again, European

three other countries with juveniles serving life sentences are Israel, South Africa, and
Tanzania—they respectively have seven, four, and one prisoner(s) serving such sentences. Adam
Liptak, Locked Away Forever After Crimes as Teenagers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2005, at A1; see
also Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, The Rest of Their Lives: Life Without
Parole for Child Offenders in the United States (2005), available at http://hrw.org/reports/2005/
us1005 (last visited April 15, 2007).
325. Brenda Goodman, North Carolina Man is 1,000th Person Executed Since 1976, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 1, 2005, at A17.
326. See, e.g., Amnesty International, Abolitionist and Retentionist Countries,
http://web.amnesty.org/pages/deathpenalty-countries-eng (last visited April 15, 2007).
327. Even in death penalty cases, the gravest of all cases,
[c]ourt-awarded funds for the appointment of investigators and experts often are either
unavailable, severely limited, or not provided by state courts. As a result, attorneys
appointed to represent capital defendants at the trial level frequently are unable to recoup
even their overhead costs and out-of-pocket expenses, and effectively may be required to
work at minimum wage or below while funding from their own pockets their client’s
defense.
McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 1256, 1258 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (stressing that the
death penalty “cannot be imposed fairly”).
328. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (holding that proof of systemic
racial discrimination in the administration of the death penalty is irrelevant if the defendant
cannot prove racial discrimination in his particular case, which is extremely hard to prove without
considering systemic patterns).
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countries seem to manage to conciliate the presumption of innocence of the
accused and the presumption of truth of the victim. 329
Moreover, the possibility of bias against defendants at the ICC must be
compared to the alternative form of justice. Many suspects who are not tried
by the ICC (or another international court) could face summary extrajudicial
executions without standing trial. Others could face trials conducted by
vindictive national courts offering far fewer due process guarantees and
harsher punishments, including oftentimes the death penalty. For instance, the
Iraqi Special Tribunal sentenced Saddam Hussein to death after a trial marred
by due process deficiencies and political interferences, despite the
reasonableness of the guilty verdict per se. 330 Conversely, the ICC provides
significant due process guarantees to defendants and its harshest punishment is
life imprisonment, which will presumably be reserved for the absolutely most
outrageous crimes, such as genocide. 331 One may therefore posit that
international justice is necessarily “pro-defendant” relative to such
alternatives. 332
In the end, time will tell whether victim participation at the ICC will
conflict with the rights of the accused. The Court should nonetheless
contemplate reconciling the conflicting rights of victims and defendants. In
particular, it is worth considering a redefinition of victim litigants as “alleged
victims” in order to avoid lowering the prosecution’s burden of proof and
shifting this burden to the defense by compelling it to rebut elements that have
not been established beyond reasonable doubt, thereby undermining the
presumption of innocence. However, even if the victim standing rule is
unchanged and applied in a way that is utterly favorable to alleged victims at
the expense of every defendant’s rights to a fair trial marked by due process of
law, it must not be forgotten that ICC prosecutions may in certain respects
prove less satisfactory for victims than truth and reconciliation commissions.
329. European civil law systems consider alleged victims as actual victims, even when they
enter proceedings before the accused has been proven guilty. See generally BRIENEN & HOEGEN,
supra note 26. Both civil and common law European systems afford the presumption of
innocence to the accused. Mario Chiavario, Private Parties: The Rights of the Defendant and the
Victim, in EUROPEAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURES 552-53 (Mireille Delmas-Marty and J. R. Spencer
eds., Cambridge University Press 2002). This principle is also recognized by the draft European
Constitution, which states: “Everyone who has been charged shall be presumed innocent until
proved guilty according to law.” DRAFT TREATY ESTABLISHING A CONSTITUTION FOR EUROPE
art. II-48, July 18, 2003, available at http://european-convention.eu.int/docs/Treaty/
cv00850.en03.pdf (last visited April 15, 2007).
330. See, e.g., Julia Preston, Hussein Trial Was Flawed but Reasonably Fair, and Verdict was
Justified, Legal Experts Say, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2006, at A10; Kirk Semple, Iraqi Predicts the
Hanging of Hussein by Year’s End, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2006, at A18.
331. ICC Statute, supra note 1, at art. 77 § 1 (b).
332. Professor Anthony D’Amato, Remarks at the Northwestern University School of Law,
The Dangers of Universal Jurisdiction: A Debate (Mar. 27, 2006).
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Victim participation in ICC proceedings will not be a panacea and should not
discourage the establishment of truth and reconciliation commissions to
address victims’ needs and facilitate peaceful democratic transition in postconflict societies.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

308

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:249

